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INCOMPLETE WILLS
Adam J. Hirsch*
This Article explores the problems that arise when a will fails to dispose of
an individual's entire estate, so that she dies partially testate and partially
intestate. The questions then raised include (1) whether provisions con-
tained in the will purporting to redefine the individual's intestate heirs
should supersede the statutory designations of those heirs, (2) whether in-
ter vivos gifts to heirs should qualify as advancements on the inheritances
of those heirs under conditions of partial intestacy, and, most broadly,
(3) whether courts should fill in the incomplete portion of an individual's
estate plan by extrapolating from the distributive preferences set out in the
fragmentary will or by independent reference to the statutory rules of in-
testacy. The intent of testators is bound to vary on each of these points, this
Article argues. In order to account for this predictable variation, lawmak-
ers should grant courts limited discretion to resolve each of these issues on
a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration both intrinsic and extrinsic
evidence. Such an approach would differentiate the rules of partial intesta-
cy from complete intestacy, which operates according to mechanical rules.
This Article suggests policy reasons for drawing that distinction. The Arti-
cle supports its analysis with empirical evidence drawn from data sets of
published cases, a resource not previously exploited in connection with
quantitative studies of inheritance law.
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INTRODUCTION
Anticipating the end of economic life, a will should leave no stone un-
turned and no property unaccounted for. One way or another, everything
previously owned by a deceased person is going to pass into someone else's
hands. The textual device for ensuring completeness of wills is a residuary
clause. After making discrete provisions for individual beneficiaries (if de-
sired), a testator concludes with an inclusive bequest: "All the rest of my
estate goes to A." The dimensions of such a clause expand or contract as the
testator accumulates or dissipates assets, covering whatever remains once all
other bequests have been satisfied-no more and no less.
The problem arises that, every so often, testators fail to construct their
wills in a manner producing a complete estate plan.' Some neglect to in-
clude an elastic residuary clause in their wills. Others include one that is
itself incomplete: it may subdivide the residue into fractions that fall short
of bequeathing the whole estate,2 or the clause may create only one or more
life estates, leaving unspecified the disposition of the remainder of the resi-
due.3 Still other testators create residuary bequests that prove ineffective for
one reason or another.4 In any such instance, the will becomes fragmentary,
disposing of some, but not the sum, of the testator's property.
When that happens, law must step in where the testator left off. Of
course, the same is also true if a person executes no will at all. In that event,
statutory law crafts an estate plan for the intestate decedent, determining the
heirs and their shares according to a schedule of contingencies. Although the
schedule that applies in any given state varies, rules of intestacy are univer-
sally designed to operate mechanically.5
1. By completeness, I mean to refer strictly to dispositional completeness, as opposed
to completeness of anticipated contingencies, a topic I have addressed elsewhere. See Adam J.
Hirsch, Text and Time: A Theory of Testamentary Obsolescence, 86 WASH. U. L. REv. 609
passim (2009).
2. For an example of such an arithmetically challenged testator, see Fed. Trust Co. v.
Ost, 183 A. 830, 832, 836-38 (N.J. Ch. 1936), aff'd, 191 A. 746 (N.J. 1937) (disposing of
fractional shares of the estate totaling only 85 percent). For the converse problem of an over-
complete will, where another dyscalculic disposed of fractional shares of his estate "greater
than the whole," see Estate ofHeisserer v. Loos, 698 S.W.2d 6, 7 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
3. See infra note 129.
4. Invalidity typically results from "lapse," where the residuary beneficiary predeceas-
es the testator. See, e.g., infra note 76 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-101 to 2-114 (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A.
43-62 (Supp. 2012).
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If a testator executes a will but leaves it incomplete, a so-called partial
intestacy occurs: a decedent can be simultaneously testate (in part), and in-
testate (in part). Considered structurally, though, the problem of partial
intestacy differs from "complete" intestacy, in that the author of an incom-
plete will has at least revealed something about her preferences in an
executed writing. As a matter of policy, the key question is whether courts
should have leave to consider testamentary context when confronted with an
incomplete estate plan. Should lawmakers treat the stated terms of a will and
the blank spaces that remain as isolated elements, filling in the blank spaces
as if there were no will at all-that is, by recourse to the regular rules of
intestacy? Or should lawmakers instead deem the terms of an incomplete
will as relevant to the process of supplying the missing terms?
This problem arises with some regularity. Professor Sayre remarked in
1929 that "[elven a cursory examination of the current digests will disclose
the large number of cases involving partial intestacy which appear in the
reports every year,"6 and that observation remains no less true today.' Yet,
the topic by and large has escaped notice by scholars. Until now, not a single
work has perused the problem as a theoretical whole, and hardly any studies
have addressed even bits of it. The instant study endeavors to fill this void.
In Part I, I reflect briefly on the characteristics of the problem and on the
analytical tools with which I shall probe it, including an empirical method-
ology not previously applied in any inheritance study. I then proceed to the
substantive issues at hand. In Part II, I consider the implications of provi-
sions in a will that ostensibly speak to the division of the intestate portion of
the estate-provisions disinheriting heirs, for example. I turn next, in Part
III, to the interplay of gifts and partial intestacy-to wit, should inter vivos
transfers to an heir diminish her eventual share by right of partial intestacy
under the same rules that apply to complete intestacy? Finally, in Part IV, I
examine the larger question, potentially subsuming the previous Parts, of
whether a will that says nothing pertinent to a partial intestacy should never-
theless serve as a template for the disposition of property not covered by the
terms of that will. My thesis, elaborated in the pages following, is that no
mechanical approach to any of these issues produces an appropriate result in
all instances. Therefore, I will make the case for allowing courts greater lati-
tude to effectuate intent in instances of partial intestacy than when presented
with a complete intestacy.
I. THEORETICAL PROLOGUE
A. The Object
Wills are exercises in freedom of testation. When testators create an in-
complete estate plan, they fail to take full advantage of the freedom they
6. Paul L. Sayre, Husband and Wife as Statutory Heirs, 42 HARV. L. REv. 330, 334
(1929).
7. See infra text accompanying note 273.
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enjoy. What policy ends should lawmakers strive to accomplish under such
conditions? Orthodox default-rule theory dictates that when a citizen fails to
execute a will, lawmakers should give effect to whatever distributive scheme
they expect the citizen would prefer, given her circumstances. By doing so,
lawmakers enable citizens to rely on the estate plan provided by the intesta-
cy statute and thereby avoid the transaction cost of executing a will. 8
This analysis breaks down in connection with an incomplete will. In es-
sence, estate planning represents an all-or-nothing proposition. One cannot
reduce the marginal cost of this endeavor by engaging an attorney scrivener
to plan for fewer assets, leaving the rest to flow under the rules of intestacy.
Because the dimensions of a will do not affect its cost, estate planners take
pains to ensure that the wills they draft are all-inclusive as a matter of
course. Hence, wills are hardly ever incomplete by design. 9 Incompleteness
typically stems from planning errors, often encountered in wills produced
by lay drafters.10 Transaction-cost efficiency offers no justification for atten-
tion to probable intent in this context.
Still, we can justify an intent-focused policy in connection with incom-
plete wills on other grounds. Because incompleteness comprises a problem
that mainly plagues homemade wills, it is one largely confined to testators
of lesser means. Economics aside, by effectuating probable intent, lawmak-
ers extend to less fortunate testators who do their own drafting the
advantages enjoyed by more affluent ones who can afford to pay for a pro-
fessional product. Lawmakers thereby heed the principle of "equal planning
under the law," a policy norm with divers and diverse applications in the
8. Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its Con-
text, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1031, 1039 (2004).
9. See Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Robert, 178 A.2d 185, 191 (N.J. 1962) ("A testator, by
the act of the making of a will, casts grave doubt on any assumption that he expressly intends
to chance dying intestate .... The idea of anyone deliberately purposing to die testate as to a
portion of his estate and intestate as to another portion is so unusual in the history of testamen-
tary disposition as to justify almost any construction to escape it." (quoting earlier cases)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Estate of Crater, 689 N.YS.2d 605, 607 (Sur. Ct.
1999) ("[I]n cases where, as here, there is no residuary clause, the presumption that a testatrix
who took the trouble of making a will did not intend to dispose of only a small part of her
estate and to die intestate as to a major part thereof, is strengthened."); see also, e.g., Kimley v.
Whittaker, 306 A.2d 443, 445 (N.J. 1973) (comparable observation); In re Astor's Will, 162
N.Y.S.2d 46, 60 (Sur. Ct. 1957) (same), aff'd, 172 N.Y.S.2d 780 (App. Div. 1958); Codding-
ton v. Stone, 9 S.E.2d 420, 424 (N.C. 1940) (same); Kaufhold v. McIver, 682 S.W.2d 660, 665
(Tex. App. 1984) (same); Arnold v. Groobey, 77 S.E.2d 382, 387-88 (Va. 1953) (same). One
can, however, identify apparent, albeit rare, exceptions where testators leave their wills in-
complete on purpose. See, e.g., Williams v. Gooch, 44 So. 2d 57, 58-59 (Miss. 1950); see also
Lyon v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 87 A. 1089, 1093-94 (Md. 1913) (observing the phenome-
non).
10. "[A] residuary clause ... is customary in a professionally drawn will." Arnold v.
Carmichael, 524 So. 2d 464, 467 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). By comparison, an empirical
study of the probate records of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, over the period 1990-1995
found that 24 percent of the holographic wills-which are invariably homemade-submitted
for probate failed to include a residuary clause. Stephen Clowney, In Their Own Hand: An
Analysis of Holographic Wills and Homemade Willmaking, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 27,
40-43,49-50 (2008).
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inheritance realm.' Both judicial opinions and academic commentary have
traditionally emphasized intent-effectuation in other doctrinal regions of the
field, such as the construction of wills. 12 The mere absence of efficiency
concerns at this juncture provides no affirmative justification for deviating
from inheritance law's central policy.
B. The Methodology
That said, how can lawmakers gain insight into the probable preferences
of a decedent who fails to elaborate her wishes under the terms of a will? In
some number of situations, we may be able to make logical inferences about
intent. Judicial opinions occasionally venture such deductions. 3 Ultimately,
though, probable intent is both a function of, and revealed by, statistics. To
answer statistical questions, we need data. Yet the sources of data open to
study shrink alarmingly once we shift our gaze from the living to the dead.
Until quite recently, some law reformers were prepared to brush the
problem aside. Reacting to criticism that the National Conference of Com-
missioners had failed to justify a provision of the Uniform Probate Code
with empirical evidence, the Reporter for the Code retorted that its authors
included "not only leading scholars in the field but also nationally known
estate planners of considerable insight and experience .... Their cumulative
experience suggests that they have a pretty good idea of what most clients
want."'14 This claim, pronounced just a decade and a half ago, already sounds
quaint today. In the interim, the current of empirical analysis has entered the
mainstream, and legal commentators now appreciate that expert impressions
afford no substitute for hard data.' And this desideratum becomes even
stronger with respect to issues such as testamentary incompleteness, which
arise out of planning errors. Seasoned estate planners know better than to
make those errors and hence have little or no experience with the wishes of
11. Professor Fellows coined the phrase. Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative
Intent, 73 IowA L. REv. 611, 613 (1988). For a further discussion, see Hirsch, supra note 8, at
1051-52. For British data on homemade wills, which are statistically associated with smaller
estates, see JANET FINCH ET AL., WILLS, INHERITANCE, AND FAMILIES 45-46 (1996).
12. In construing a will, to recall Chancellor Kent's famous metaphor, intent-effectuation
represents "the pole-star by which the courts must steer." 4 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW *537. For further references, see Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency,
57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1114 nn.170-72 (1996).
13. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 9.
14. Lawrence W. Waggoner, Correspondence, The Uniform Probate Code Extends
Antilapse-Type Protection to Poorly Drafted Trusts, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2309, 2337-38 (1996).
15. For discussions, see, for example, Robyn M. Dawes et al., Clinical Versus Actuarial
Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 716, 723-
26 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); Hirsch, supra note 8, at 1070-74 (citing psychological
studies and noting an example of evidence demonstrating the superiority of empirical data
over expert judgment within the inheritance field); Hirsch, supra note 1, at 656-58; and Wil-
liam Meadow & Cass R. Sunstein, Statistics, Not Experts, 51 DUKE L.J. 629 passim (2001).
For a similar observation in connection with default rules in contract law, see Yair Listokin,
The Meaning of Contractual Silence: A Field Experiment, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 397, 400
(2010).
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testators who leave their wills incomplete; the wills that experts draft never
are.
No shortcuts, then, to the discovery of probable intent lie at our disposal.
And barring a breakthrough in Ouija technology, we cannot readily tally the
preferences of those who have passed from the scene. None of the available
sources of data concerning their wishes comes without drawbacks of various
sizes and shapes, threatening to compromise the data's reliability.
Many of the extant studies rely on surveys of the living as surrogates for
decedents. These studies have collected information by distributing ques-
tionnaires or by conducting interviews over the telephone. Some researchers
have solicited information about subjects' actual estate plans or distributive
preferences.' 6 Others have posed hypothetical questions to subjects, eliciting
their reactions to imaginary scenarios. 17
One difficulty with this technique is that the subset of persons who agree
to participate in a study may be biased in ways that skew the results. 8 What
is more, we have no assurance that subjects will even report their estate
plans or preferences accurately. To the extent that her preferences deviate
from perceived social norms, a subject might prevaricate to avoid embar-
rassment in her interaction with the researcher. And even assuming
subjects do state their preferences honestly, responses to a hypothetical vi-
gnette remain just that-hypothetical. Subjects may lack insight into
16. E.g., MARVIN B. SUSSMAN ET AL., THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE passim (1970);
Monica K. Johnson & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Using Social Science to Inform the Law of
Intestacy: The Case of Unmarried Committed Partners, 22 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 479, 485
(1998).
17. E.g., Mary Louise Fellows et al., An Empirical Study of the Illinois Statutory Estate
Plan, 1976 U. ILL. L.E 717, 722; Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property
Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 321, 327-30.
18. This problem, known technically as nonresponse bias, has received considerable
attention within the theoretical literature of polling. For a review, see Robert M. Groves, Non-
response Rates and Nonresponse Bias in Household Surveys, 70 PUB. OPINION Q. 646 passim
(2006). For example, volunteerism is statistically associated with a willingness to be polled.
Katharine G. Abraham et al., How Social Processes Distort Measurement: The Impact of Sur-
vey Nonresponse on Estimates of Volunteer Work in the United States, 114 Am. J. Soc. 1129
passim (2009). This association suggests the possibility that surveys of persons' propensities
to make charitable bequests would yield distorted data. See id. at 1134, 1162 (suggesting such
a polling distortion for charitable contributions). For some other demonstrated influences on
survey participation, see Groves, supra, at 664. Among these influences, socioeconomic status
"appears[s] to have variable effects over modes, topics, or sponsors of surveys." Id. In recent
decades, nonresponse rates to surveys have increased, see Richard Curtin et al., Changes in
Telephone Survey Nonresponse over the Past Quarter Century, 69 PUB. OPINION Q. 87 passim
(2005), enhancing the potential for nonresponse bias, although nonresponse levels appear to
have no direct relationship to nonresponse bias, see id. at 97 (citing studies); Groves, supra, at
669-70.
19. This phenomenon is well known to sociologists, see TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE
TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION (1995),
and to pollsters, see Roger Tourangeau & Ting Yan, Sensitive Questions in Surveys, 133 Psy-
CHOL. BULL. 859 passim (2007).
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scenarios alien to their experiences,20 and they might offer snap judgments
that differ systematically from the more reflective choices made by actual
testators. 21 In this regard, eliciting data on how subjects would prefer to fill
in the incomplete terms of an imaginary will appears futile-subjects would
have no factual foundation on which to predicate their answers. Nor is a
search for living testators who actually have an incomplete will practically
feasible. Testators in this predicament rarely are aware of the fact; typically,
evidence of incompleteness only comes to light in a probate proceeding.
The other traditional source of raw data for empirical inheritance studies
is probate records. 22 Data gathered from this source provide trustworthy evi-
dence of how testators behave in practice. What is more, unlike living
subjects, decedents who make wills cannot refuse to contribute data to re-
searchers. As collections of all wills submitted for probate, the records are
comprehensive, and they also constitute public documents. 23
Still, skewing could result from the data set's limitation to decedents
whose estates are probated. 24 Poorer persons are disproportionately likely to
execute no will, 5 and, whether they leave one or not, their estates are more
likely to be settled informally. 26 At the same time, wealthier persons appear
more inclined to rely on will substitutes that avoid probate and, unlike pro-
bated wills, remain private documents.2 7 Probate records would seem a
particularly unpromising resource for the study of incomplete wills.
20. One pair of researchers attempted to respond to this problem by limiting their anal-
ysis to "persons who could easily relate to the scenario." Johnson & Robbennolt, supra note
16, at 495-96.
21. See Gregory Mitchell, Second Thoughts, 40 McGEORGE L. REv. 687, 690-709
(2009) (marshaling the psychological literature on reflective versus impulsive judgment). It is
a commonplace among estate planners that testators often make last-minute revisions before
executing their wills. See JAMES B. STEWART, THE PARTNERS 283-85 (1983), for an anecdotal
example, discussing the estate plan of the late Nelson Rockefeller.
22. E.g., Kristine S. Knaplund, The Evolution of Women's Rights in Inheritance, 19
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 3, 13-20 (2008); Frederick R. Schneider, A Kentucky Study of Will
Provisions: Implicationsfor Intestate Succession Law, 13 N. Ky. L. REv. 409, 411-13 (1987).
23. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 440 (8th ed. 2009).
24. The two most recent empirical studies found the proportion of decedents' estates
undergoing probate proceedings to range between 20% and 34% (and as low as 16% in one
outlier year) of total deaths, depending on the state. Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Will Contests-An
Empirical Study, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 607, 611-13 (1987) (noting earlier studies);
Robert A. Stein & Ian G. Fierstein, The Demography of Probate Administration, 15 U. BALT.
L. Rv. 54, 60-62 (1985). For another possible distortion relating to any data set of wills, see
Hirsch, supra note 8, at 1073 n.172 (suggesting that some subset of testators may rely on
existing default rules and express preferences within wills only when they run counter to those
default rules).
25. For discussions of the statistical correlation between poverty and intestacy, see
Hirsch, supra note 8, at 1051 n.72, and Stein & Fierstein, supra note 24, at 82-83.
26. On the tendency of smaller estates to forego probate, see Schoenblum, supra note
24, at 612 n.29, and Stein & Fierstein, supra note 24, at 62.
27. The tendency of wealthier estates to pass via living trusts and other nonprobate will
substitutes is less pronounced, although some data support the proposition. Stein & Fierstein,
supra note 24, at 92-95.
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Incompleteness may not appear on the face of the wills preserved in the
probate records in those instances where residuary clauses are void (rather
than absent). And recorded wills may also fail to illuminate how testators
would have preferred to round out their estate plans.
This Article mines a third vein of data for the quantitative analysis of
probable intent-a source not previously exploited in any existing studies in
connection with inheritance law. Although this source of data will play just a
part in the analysis presented here, its potential for enriching other
inheritance studies bears noting; we should pause to remark its comparative
advantages, as well as its disadvantages.
The data set developed in this Article derives from legal cases appearing
in published law reports. One useful feature of this resource is its cumula-
tive size, accreting over some two centuries in the United States. Although
these cases represent only a drop in the ocean of estates catalogued in the
surviving probate records, this mass of cases is easier to explore empirically.
The cases are helpfully collected in electronic databases that the researcher
can search by algorithm to pinpoint pertinent units of data. What is more,
those cases may make available information not found in probate records.
Often enough, judicial opinions reproduce sworn testimony, along with oth-
er factual details not divulged within the language of a will.28 Opinions can
therefore furnish evidence of incompleteness and of intent missing from the
leaner probate records while featuring greater reliability than evidence har-
vested from an off-the-cuff survey.
No less importantly, the researcher can conduct such a study cost-
efficiently.29 The Reporter for the Uniform Probate Code excuses its failure
(and the parallel failure of the Restatements) to rely on empirical evidence
on the grounds that neither the National Conference of Commissioners nor
the American Law Institute has the means to sponsor the requisite studies.30
Because an empirical analysis of legal cases requires no archival research or
field interviewing, a model lawmaking body-substantially composed of
academics-could undertake the study without obtaining a grant. The in-
stant study, pursued within an academic setting, relied on student research
assistants to help collect and code the data, drawing on a budget for student
assistants made available in some amount to professors at all major Ameri-
can law schools.
The concern remains that the data set of legal cases provides a relatively
small sample of the universe of all estates. In one respect, the data set of
published cases surpasses the range of probate records, in that these cases
also cover litigation over living trusts (whose terms, although private, re-
main subject to discovery). Still, only a fraction of probate proceedings
28. See, e.g., infra notes 102-103.
29. Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue LI, Studying the Iceberg from Its lip: A Com-
parison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAw & Soc'Y
REv. 1133, 1166 (1990). Karl Llewellyn was an early advocate of behavioral studies based on
this data source. Id. at 1136 n.9.
30. Waggoner, supra note 14, at 2309, 2337-38.
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degenerate into a will contest, 31 only a fraction of those contests culminate
in a decision rather than a settlement,32 and only an (apparently shrinking33)
fraction of those decisions ultimately appear, in print or in silica, as dissem-
inated opinions. 34
Accordingly, the sample of estates represented by all legal cases, how-
ever accessible, wide-ranging, and rich in factual data, could again suffer
from selection bias. For example, theory suggests that litigation is more
likely to ensue and to result in a published case where greater sums lie at
stake. 35 Other biases may also exist,36 and further concerns could crop up
specifically in connection with the analysis of incomplete-will cases, as
noted hereinafter.37 To the extent that this data set-along with survey evi-
dence and probate records-is subject to economic skewing, 38 the researcher
31. Empirical studies find that parties contest only around 1 percent of probated wills.
SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 184; Schoenblum, supra note 24, at 613-15; cf. Jeffrey P.
Rosenfeld, Will Contests: Legacies of Aging and Social Change, in INHERITANCE AND
WEALTH IN AMERICA 173, 183-85 (Robert K. Miller, Jr. & Stephen J. McNamee eds., 1998)
(presenting apparently conflicting data).
32. Schoenblum, supra note 24, at 618-21. For more general statistics, see Kevin M.
Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119, 135-36
(2002), and Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 29, at 1146.
33. The trend has been observed in other contexts. See William L. Reynolds & William
M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals:
The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 573 passim (1981) (data on the percentage of un-
published circuit court opinions); see also Burton M. Atkins, Data Collection in Comparative
Judicial Research: A Note on the Effects of Case Publication upon Theory Building and Hy-
pothesis Testing, 45 POL. RES. Q. 783, 785 (1992) (British data); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald
Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990
DUKE L.J. 984, 1055 (1990) (administrative law case data).
34. See Catherine Albiston, The Rule of Law and the Litigation Process: The Paradox
of Losing by Winning, 33 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 869, 888-89 (1999) (citing statistical studies on
the rate of published opinions in the Eleventh Circuit and in employment discrimination cas-
es).
35. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.5, at 765-66 (8th ed.
2011) (discussing amount-in-controversy as a factor in the economic model of litigation ver-
sus settlement); Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 29, at 1152-53 (finding empirical evidence
of an association between greater amounts-in-controversy and case publication).
36. Of course, even within a biased sample of published cases, the sample may remain
representative for some, but not for other, characteristics. Susan M. Olson, Studying Federal
District Courts Through Published Cases: A Research Note, 15 JUST. Sys. J. 782, 795-96
(1992); Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 29, at 1136-37, 1145. For example, links between
publication decisions and the characteristics of the judge sitting on a case, see, e.g., Ahmed E.
Taha, Publish or Paris? Evidence of How Judges Allocate Their Time, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
1, 18-19, 21-23 (2004), should remain independent of the distribution of testamentary prefer-
ences, assuming random assignment of cases. For discussion concerning other factors related
to publication, see, for example, Brian N. Lizotte, Publish or Perish: The Electronic Availabil-
ity of Summary Judgments by Eight District Courts, 2007 Wis. L. REV. 107, 138-43 (citing
studies); Olson, supra, at 784-95; Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 29, at 1150-56; Karen
Swenson, Federal District Court Judges and the Decision to Publish, 25 JUST. SYs. J. 121,
135-36 (2004); and Taha, supra, at 20-21, 23-25.
37. See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text, and text following notes 98, 274.
38. See supra notes 18, 25-27, 35 and accompanying text.
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can compensate by using more sophisticated techniques of stratified or quo-
ta sampling, although not without adding to the cost and complexity of the
task at hand.3 9 But we cannot control so easily for other biases, 40 let alone
those that remain obscure to the researcher.
4 1
Ultimately, then, we should rate a data set composed of published cases
in the inheritance realm as suggestive, rather than definitive, and we cannot
ignore the possibility that results gleaned from published cases comprise an
artifact of the data set. Like other potential sources of data available to us,
we have recourse to this one for better and for worse. Prudence thus de-
mands that we remain modest in our claims about the import of the data. In
fact, this diffidence can figure into the substance, as well as the strength, of
our conclusions, as we shall presently see.42 In light of our reservations
about this and other sources of data, the ideal (albeit most costly) approach
may be to study, and then to cross-examine, multiple data sets-published
cases, and survey evidence, and probate records-in order to render our
empirical conclusions more (or less) persuasive.43 I have not endeavored to
test my data in this manner in the instant study, largely because survey and
probate studies appear so lacking in promise as windows into incomplete
wills. Worthless data is not worth its cost.
But all of this is just by way of introduction. We turn now to the doctri-
nal issues of incomplete wills. The first of these concerns the effectiveness
of provisions in a will that purport to operate on the missing parts through
means other than outright bequests.
39. STEVEN K. THOMPSON, SAMPLING 141-54 (3d ed. 2012); Groves, supra note 18, at
653. Cases typically reveal the approximate size of the estate at issue, along with some other
information about the testator that would facilitate quota sampling.
40. The variable causing bias may go unreported in the data set and bear no statistical
correlation with other variables that are reported. See, e.g., Abraham et al., supra note 18, at
1134, 1162-63 (noting the problem in connection with survey response rates).
41. Although several studies have sought to isolate factors that have historically influ-
enced the selection of cases for publication, see supra notes 35-36, scholars have yet to
develop a general behavioral model, comparable to the economic model of settlement, with
which to predict patterns of publication, see Olson, supra note 36, at 796-97 (suggesting the
need for such a model).
42. See infra text following notes 99, 107, 145.
43. Studies have identified inconsistencies between alternative data sets that only come
to light upon comparative analysis. See e.g., Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 29, at 1150-
56 (studying data sets of published and unpublished employment discrimination cases). At
least two inheritance studies rely on multiple sources of data. See SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note
16, at 44-45 (probate records and survivor interviews); Contemporary Studies Project, A
Comparison of Iowans' Dispositive Preferences with Selective Provisions of the Iowa and
Uniform Probate Codes, 63 IOWA L. REV. 1041, 1045 (1978) (probate records, survivor inter-
views, and a random survey); cf Johnson & Robbennolt, supra note 16, at 485 (using a single
source of data to gather evidence of both actual estate plans and attitudes toward hypothetical
scenarios).
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II. REDEFINITIVE WILLS
Testators typically express their intent by providing items or sums to
beneficiaries. When testators leave incomplete wills, those items and sums
fail to account for the entire estate. At this point, under current law, we look
to the intestacy statute to furnish the balance of the estate plan. By tradition,
intestacy statutes establish mechanical rules of distribution on the basis of
contingencies, mainly concerning who the decedent's surviving family
members are and how closely related they were to the decedent. Courts can-
not consider evidence of intent when they apply rules of intestacy.
It happens that some testators express intentions about the distribution of
their estates that do not take the form of explicit bequests. Occasionally, a
will includes a statement that can be read to redefine who the testator's in-
testate heirs are. Such a redefinitive provision could become relevant if the
will proves incomplete. But is such a provision recognized as legally effec-
tive? This issue has generated a fair bit of interest among lawmakers and
among model lawmaking bodies. Or, to be more exact, part of it has.
A. Negative Wills
Consider a will that makes various bequests and then continues, "Under
no circumstances shall my child, A, receive any portion of my estate," or
words to that effect. In the context of a complete will, a statement along
these lines is superfluous. The will itself provides all the information the
court needs to distribute the entire estate to beneficiaries who the will af-
firmatively names. Any identification of beneficiaries excluded from the
estate plan serves merely to add an exclamation point.
But suppose instead that the will fails to dispose of the testator's entire
estate. The testator's child, A, comprises one of the heirs entitled to inherit,
all else being equal, under the intestacy statute, which now controls that part
of the estate to which the will failed to speak. The issue then arises whether
the so-called "negative will"'4 operates to bar the disinherited heir from tak-
ing by right of intestacy-that is, whether the negative will redefines the
statutory heirs.45 Similarly, a will could provide that a beneficiary receive a
44. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101 cmt. (amended 2010), 8 pt. I U.L.A. 43 (Supp.
2012). Although found only occasionally in the cases, this term may trace to phrasing in
Vachell v. Breton, (1706) 2 Eng. Rep. 527 (H.L.) 528; 5 Bro. P.C. 51, 54 ("the express nega-
tive words of the testator's will").
45. The validity of negative wills need not arise exclusively in connection with cases of
partial intestacy. If a testamentary instrument makes no bequests at all.or makes only invalid
bequests, then a negative will set out in the instrument would operate in conjunction with a
complete intestacy. E.g., Kimley v. Whittaker, 306 A.2d 443, 444-45 (N.J. 1973) (concerning
a testamentary instrument whose sole affirmative bequest was invalid due to lapse); In re Hef-
ner's Will, 122 N.Y.S.2d 252, 253-54 (Sur. Ct. 1953) (concerning a testamentary instrument
composed of nothing more than a negative will); see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-201(57)
(amended 2010), 8 pt. I U.L.A. 19 (Supp. 2012) (expressly validating a will that serves mere-
ly to exclude heirs). In connection with complete wills, negative wills raise issues of standing
by disinherited heirs to challenge affirmative bequests. See infra Part II.A.3. Finally, the pres-
ence of a negative will can figure in a construction proceeding, influencing the court's
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certain sum "and nothing more of my estate," or words to that effect-not a
pure negative will but, we might say, a limiting will. Again, the issue arises
in connection with an incomplete will whether the limit established in that
document also carries over to intestacy to block any statutory inheritance
rights over and above the capped bequest.
British courts faced this "perplexing question" 46 for the first time early
in the eighteenth century. Before long, those courts were hopelessly divided
over the issue. Some gave effect to negative wills.4 7 Others declined to do
SO.48 And still others sought to reconcile these lines of cases by drawing
doubtful distinctions between them. 49 The most recent British case on point,
dating to 1983, takes the view that negative wills are enforceable, a position
also accepted elsewhere in the Commonwealth.50
In the United States as well, this issue has produced a steady trickle of
published cases. The first American cases, dating to the early nineteenth
century, cited to British authorities and soon echoed their lack of consen-
sus." Over time, however, the view that negative wills are ineffective gained
determination of whether the will in which a negative will appears is complete. In a recent
case, where the validity of a will turned on whether oral instructions referred to in a will were
mandatory or precatory, the court cited the inclusion of a negative will to justify a construction
rendering the will valid. Glenn v. Roberts, 95 So.3d 271, 274 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); see
also Bakos v. Kryder, 543 S.W.2d 216, 219-20 (Ark. 1976) (pointing to a nominal bequest to
all heirs as evidence of an implied residuary bequest). For additional cases, see infra note 249.
46. Ramsay v. Shelmerdine, (1865) 1 L.R.Eq. 129, 134.
47. E.g., Vachell, 2 Eng. Rep. at 528; Ramsay, 1 L.R.Eq. at 134 (dicta); Bund v. Green,
(1879) 12 Ch.D. 819 at 821-22.
48. E.g., Denn v. Gaskin, (1777) 98 Eng. Rep. 1292 (K.B.) 1294; 2 Cowp. 657, 660
(Lord Mansfield); Pickering v. Stamford, (1797) 30 Eng. Rep. 1121 (Ch.) 1122; 3 Ves. Jun.
491, 494 (rejecting Vachell with the observation that "[i]t must be recollected, that the point
... was in some doubt at that time"); Johnson v. Johnson, (1841) 49 Eng. Rep. 361 (Ch.) 361-
62; 4 Beav. 318, 318-19 (appeal taken, no final disposition reported).
49. E.g., Lett v. Randall, (1855) 107 Rev. Rep. 26 (Ch.) 29-32; 3 Sm. & G. 83, 87-91
(giving effect to a negative will, per the rule of Vachell, and seeking to distinguish Pickering
on the ground that the negative will in that case was less "comprehensive" than in the will at
issue), aff'd, (1860) 45 Eng. Rep. (Ch.) 671; 2 D.F. & J. 388; Holmes v. Holmes (Re Holmes),
(1890) 62 L.T. 383 (Ch.) at 383-84 (denying effect to a negative will, seeking to distinguish
Vachell on the ground that there the beneficiary was put to an election to take what was of-
fered under the will or under the intestacy statute, and seeking to distinguish Bund on the
ground that there the words of exclusion of some heirs amounted to a gift to the other heirs).
50. Landolt v. Wynn (Re Wynn), [1983] 3 All E.R. 310 (Ch.) at 313-14. For Canadian
cases, compare Bateman v. Bateman, [1941] 3 D.L.R. 762, 763 (Can. N.B. S.C.) (barring a
negative will, citing Re Holmes), with Re Sharpe (1985), 18 D.L.R. 4th 421, 425-28 (Can.
Nfld. S.C.) (giving effect to a negative will, citing Re Wynn, rejecting Bateman, and dismissing
Re Holmes as a case whose "reasoning defies logic, ignores the unmistakable intention of the
testator and is totally at variance with the common law").
51. Compare Jackson ex dem. Bogert v. Schauber, 7 Cow. 187, 197 (N.Y Gen. Term
1827) (citing British authority in holding a negative will ineffective), rev 'don other grounds, 2
Wend. 13 (N.Y 1828), and Boisseau v. Aldridges, 32 Va. (5 Leigh) 222, 237-41 (1834)
(same), with Bender v. Dietrick, 7 Watts & Serg. 284, 287 (Pa. 1844) (asserting in dicta that a
negative will is effective for personal property, citing to different British authority). See also,
e.g., Doe ex dem. Hoyle v. Stowe, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 318, 323-24 (1830) (asserting in dicta that
negative wills are effective, without citing authority).
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acceptance within American common law,52 and modem cases have over-
ruled most contrary precedents without smothering them entirely. 3
In more recent years, statutory law in a number of jurisdictions has sup-
planted the common law to give effect to negative wills. In 1967, New York
became the first state to enact such legislation.5 4 The original version of the
Uniform Probate Code, promulgated two years later, failed to address the
issue. 5 In 1990, though, as part of a general revision of the substantive arti-
cles of the Code, the Commissioners added sections explicitly validating
negative wills. 5 6 Fifteen states have since enacted statutes based on this lan-
guage; four others have enacted nonuniform legislation to the same effect.
5 7
Finally, in 1999, the third Restatement of Property chimed in, urging courts
to reverse the common law nullification of negative wills in jurisdictions
where statutory law fails to govern the issue.5" We cannot count the
52. By 1960, a court could overrule a prior state case giving effect to negative wills on
the ground that it ran counter to "the general rule" of the United States. Conlon v. Douglas (In
re Estate of Brown), 106 N.W.2d 535, 537 (Mich. 1960). For a collection of cases, see J.
Kraut, Annotation, Effect of Will Provision Cutting off Heir or Next of Kin, or Restricting Him
to Provision Made, to Exclude Him from Distribution of Intestate Property, 100 A.L.R.2d 325
passim (1965).
53. See Succession of Allen, 20 So. 193, 198 (La. 1896) (giving effect to a negative will
in the face of statutory silence and never reversed by a state case), aff'd, 22 So. 319 (La.
1897), rev'd on other grounds, 173 U.S. 389 (1899); Kimley v. Whittaker, 306 A.2d 443, 444-
45 (N.J. 1973) (suggesting the same in dicta), subsequently codified by N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 3B:5-2 (2005); Staaben v. Jabs (In re Estate of Farber), 204 N.W.2d 478, 480-82 (Wis.
1973) (giving effect to a negative will when supplemented by a positive statement naming the
statutory heirs who were to take), superseded by statute, WIS. STAT. § 852.10 (2012) (validat-
ing negative wills generally). There was some uncertainty as to the state of the law in New
York at the time when it adopted its pathbreaking statute approving negative wills in 1967. See
In re Estate of Potter, 327 N.Y.S.2d 680, 682-83 (Sur. Ct. 1971).
54. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 1-2.19 (McKinney 1967).
55. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101 (pre-1990 version of article 2), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A.
272 (1998). The antecedent Model Probate Code had likewise failed to treat the issue. See
MODEL PROBATE CODE § 23, reprinted in LEWIS M. SIMES & PAUL E. BASYE, PROBLEMS IN
PROBATE LAW 23, 64 (1946).
56. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-201(56) (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 23 (Supp. 2012)
(definitional section); id. § 2-101(b), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 43 (Supp. 2012) (substantive section).
57. For statutes tracking the Uniform Probate Code, see ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.101
(2010); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2101 (2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-101 (2012);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-101 (2010); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 2-101 (LexisNexis
2011); MICH. ComP. LAWS SERV. § 700.2101 (LexisNexis 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-
101 (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-111 (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B: 5-2 (West
2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-101 (2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-01 (2010); 20 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2101 (West 2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-101 (2012); UTAH
CODE ANN. 1953 § 75-2-101 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); and W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-2 (Lex-
isNexis 2012). For statutes following nonuniform language, see NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 132.370 (2011) (adopting the Code's definitional section without its substantive section, as
construed in Nevada v. Palm (In re Estate of Melton), 272 P.3d 668, 674-77 (Nev. 2012));
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 1-2.19 (McKinney 2012); TEx. PROB. CODE ANN.
§§ 3(ff), 58(b) (West Supp. 2012); and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 852.10 (West 2002).
58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.7
(1999). Prior iterations of the Restatement of Property had not dealt with the issue.
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Restatement as an independent voice, however, since both the Restatement
and the Uniform Probate Code share the same Reporter.59 At any rate, no
cases reconsidering the common law of negative wills have yet appeared.
Altogether twenty states today give effect to negative wills either by statute
or case law.60 Twenty-five do not, and the issue has yet to arise in the re-
maining five.61
The argument repeatedly offered in favor of honoring negative wills is
simple enough: doing so accords with the intent of the testator. The medium
through which testators express their intent should make no difference, crit-
ics have urged: "[A] clearly expressed negative intention is entitled to equal
weight with a positive one. '62 New York's pioneering statutory reform of the
law of negative wills in 1967 was premised on this rationale. 63 In unison, the
Uniform Probate Code and the Restatement both opine that the American
common law rule "defeats a testator's intent for no sufficient reason. '64
Courts in turn have defended the traditional rule on several grounds. One
venerable rationale is formalistic in nature: courts assert that, whereas a
testator is free to bequeath under a will, "no man can institute a law of
descent [i.e., intestacy] for his own property, in conflict with the general
law."65 In other words, a will can supersede the statutory rules of intestacy
59. The language of the respective comments, and even of the examples accompanying
the Uniform Probate Code and the Restatement, correspond strikingly. Compare UNIF. PRO-
BATE CODE § 2-101 cmt. (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 43 (Supp. 2012), with RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.7 cmts. a-c, & illus. 1 (1999).
60. See statutes cited supra note 57; Succession of Allen, 20 So. 193, 198 (La. 1896),
aff'd, 22 So. 319 (La. 1897), rev'd on other grounds, 173 U.S. 389 (1899).
61. The issue has never appeared in a published case in Idaho, Oregon, Vermont, Wash-
ington, or Wyoming.
62. In re Estate of Weissmann, 243 N.YS. 127, 132 (Sur. Ct. 1930), aff'd, 247 N.YS.
901 (App. Div. 1931) (criticizing in dicta the invalidity of negative wills); see also In re Estate
of Dammann, 191 N.E.2d 452, 454 (N.Y 1963) (observing in dicta that "we reach a point
where a clearly and unmistakably expressed negative is as complete and unavoidable a state-
ment of intent as if cast in the affirmative").
63. In re Estate of Stoffel, 427 N.Y.S.2d 720, 721 (Sur. Ct. 1980), aff'd, 437 N.YS.2d
922 (App. Div. 1980) (quoting the Bennett Commission on law reform).
64. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101 cmt. (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 43 (Supp.
2012); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.7 cmt. a
(1999). For prior academic commentary, see Frederick S. Schwartz, Models of the Will and
Negative Disinheritance, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1137 passim (1997) (advocating giving effect to
negative wills); Alfred Gordon, Note, Eliciting the True Intent of a Testator: Do Negative Wills
Have a Place?, 13 PROB. L.J. 1 passim (1995) (defending the traditional rule); and J. Andrew
Heaton, Comment, The Intestate Claims of Heirs Excluded by Will: Should "Negative Wills"
Be Enforced?, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 177 passim (1985) (advocating giving effect to negative
wills).
65. Boisseau v. Aldridges, 32 Va. (5 Leigh) 222, 243 (1834) (Tucker, J., dissenting in
part). The argument traces to several of the earliest British cases on negative wills. E.g., Denn
v. Gaskin, (1777) 98 Eng. Rep. 1292 (K.B.) 1294; 2 Cowp. 657, 660 (Lord Mansfield); Picker-
ing v. Stamford, (1797) 30 Eng. Rep. 1121 (Ch.) 1122; 3 Ves. Jun. 491, 494. For other early
American recitations of this rationale, see, for example, Haxtun v. Corse, 2 Barb. Ch. 506,
521-22 (N.Y. Ch. 1848), and Crane v. Executors of Doty, 1 Ohio St. 279, 283 (1853). The
argument remains current and common: "the disposition [of the undevised property] is not
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but cannot modify them; once we proceed to the statute to apportion property
not distributed by will, the will no longer operates. A negative will purports to
redefine shares during this second stage, after the mechanical rules of
intestacy have come into effect. In this dimension, however, intent becomes
irrelevant, and any expressions of authority emanating from a will comprise
(in the delightful words of one early court) "a perfect brutumfulmen"-inert
thunder.
66
As a matter of policy, obviously, this argument begs the question. Nega-
tive wills could easily enough become part of the "general law" 67 of
intestacy if a legislature viewed their enforcement as expedient. Even as a
doctrinal matter, the suggestion that the intestacy statute takes precedence
over negative wills is questionable.68 Testators can negate other statutory
default rules by virtue of individualized provisions in their wills. For exam-
ple, a testator's statement in a will that "any child of mine omitted from this
will receives no share of my estate under the pretermitted child statute," suf-
fices to preempt that statute. This special type of negative will is universally
acknowledged as valid because, in every jurisdiction, the statute expressly
bows to contrary expressions of intent within a will.69 Although they like-
wise comprise default rules, traditional intestacy statutes make no such
express allowance for a negative will-but neither do they expressly disal-
low one as a means of ousting the default rule. The treatment of negative
wills therefore represents a lacuna in most intestacy statutes, which courts
could claim the right to fill with common law. Courts inclined to give effect
to negative wills have brushed aside the suggestion that they lacked the
power to do so.70
governed by [the] will, but by another rule having its origin in another source, in the applica-
tion of which the intent of the testator is not the governing rule, and can have no influence."
Bray v. Bray, 269 N.E.2d 452, 453 (Mass. 1971) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also, e.g., Cook v. Estate of Seeman, 858 S.W.2d 114, 115 (Ark. 1993).
66. Holmes v. Holmes (Re Holmes), (1890) 62 L.T. 383 (Ch.) at 383 (Eng.).
67. Boisseau, 32 Va. at 243; see also supra text accompanying note 65.
68. An analogous argument that spendthrift trusts operated to "repeal" the statutory law
of creditors' rights persuaded only a small number of courts. See Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift
Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 56
(1995).
69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.6(c)
(2003); see also, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-302(b)(1) (amended 2010), 8 pt. I U.L.A.
124-25 (Supp. 2012). Several courts have elaborated both rules in the same breath, without
addressing the conflict. E.g., Clark v. Baxter (In re Estate of Baxter), 827 P.2d 184, 186-87
(Okla. Civ. App. 1992) ("[A] disinheritance clause, no matter how broadly or strongly
phrased, operates only to prevent a claimant from taking under the will itself, or to obviate the
claim of pretermission, but does not and cannot operate to prevent heirs at law from taking
under statutory rules of inheritance .... " (paraphrasing Henderson v. Snow (In re Estate of
Barnes), 407 P.2d 656, 659 (Cal. 1965))); see also Coleman v. Offutt (In re Estate of Cole-
man), 718 P.2d 702, 704 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) (similar statement).
70. E.g., Tabor v. Mclntire, 79 Ky. 505, 506-07 (1881) ("While the testatrix had no
right to alter the laws of descent, yet she had the right to dispose of her property as she
wished, and might... exclude ... persons who would otherwise inherit."), overruled by Todd
v. Gentry, 109 Ky. 704 (1901).
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More purposefully, several early courts asserted that by nullifying nega-
tive wills, at least those directed at descendants, lawmakers advanced social
policy. Because "[the] act of disinheriting a child ... is one which the law
cannot regard very favorably," courts felt justified in insisting that testators
accomplish their intent through the limited channel of affirmative bequests.7'
Viewed from this perspective, a law invalidating negative wills would make
the default rule in favor of inheritance by descendants a "sticky default," in
theoretical jargon, allowing testators to override the default but only by fol-
lowing the appropriate "altering rule."72
Sticky defaults become difficult to condone in the realm of inheritance,
however, because they inevitably discriminate against more poorly
counseled testators.7 3 If the social policy at issue is important enough, then
lawmakers should make rules that promote it mandatory and applicable to
all. Sticky defaults merely set traps for the unwary. At any rate, lawmakers
no longer strive to reinforce the rights of descendants-if anything, law-
makers have eased the task of overriding intestacy statutes, for example, by
streamlining the formalities of will execution.74 The notion that invalidating
negative wills serves to protect the interests of descendants is plainly outdat-
ed, and it has not reappeared in modem cases.75
Still other courts have defended the common law rule invalidating nega-
tive wills as potentially consistent with testators' intent. These courts point
out that because few testators anticipate partial intestacy, intending rather to
execute a complete will, they do not ordinarily contemplate that negative
wills serve any distributive function. When some unforeseen circumstance
subsequently renders a will incomplete, its author might well prefer that a
disinheriting provision remain insignificant. As one court explained, "The
will was made in view of conditions existing at the time of its execution
.... What [the testator's] actual intent may have been after the conditions
were changed by the death of [a residuary beneficiary, causing a partial in-
testacy], we have no means of knowing .... ""
71. Stewart v. Pattison, 8 Gill 46, 58 (Md. 1849) ("If the will be so explicit that [chil-
dren be disinherited], let it be so .... but a mere intention will not defeat [such] children.");
see also Phillups v. Phillups, 20 S.W. 541, 542 (Ky. 1892) ("[W]hen [a testator] leaves a part
of [his estate] undisposed of, it is the object of the law to cast the descent so as to equalize all
his descendants, his intention to the contrary notwithstanding.").
72. See Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121
YALE L.J. 2032, 2036, 2045 (2012).
73. For a fuller discussion, see Hirsch, supra note 8, at 1042-52.
74. Hirsch, supra note 12, at 1067-69.
75. See In re Estate of Weissman, 243 N.Y.S. 127, 131-32 (Sur. Ct. 1930) (rejecting in
dicta the notion that heirs' rights are "semivested" and urging that negative wills should be
held effective), aff'd, 247 N.Y.S. 901 (App. Div. 1931).
76. Hittell v. Greer (In re Estate of Hittell), 75 P. 53, 54 (Cal. 1903); see also cases
cited infra notes 82, 120.
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1. Analysis
How confident can we be, then, about a testator's intent to redefine heirs
by virtue of a negative will? That is the crux of the matter, which lawmakers
bent on giving effect to such language appear to have breezed over a trifle
too quickly. The best way to pursue the problem is to consider what might
prompt testators to make a negative will and then to gauge their probable
intentions in that light. Upon investigation, one discovers several possible
inspirations for these provisions, all found regularly in the published cases.
One obvious stimulus for a negative will is feelings of hostility toward
the identified family member (or members). Testators sometimes couch a
disinheriting provision expressly in such terms: "[These heirs] never bother
about me in life. So I remember them in Death."77 Logic suggests that when
sentiments of this sort inform an estate plan, the testator would prefer that a
negative will govern the distribution of the estate, to the extent that the intes-
tacy statute becomes relevant. 78 Intervening events that might render it
relevant-such as invalidity of the residuary bequest because the residuary
taker predeceases the testator-appear unlikely to ameliorate the testator's
expressed antagonism toward particular heirs who do survive.
At least one court has assumed that a negative will implied "dislike" of
the disinherited heirs, even though the will failed to say So; 79 perhaps model
lawmakers who advocate giving effect to disinheriting provisions make the
same assumption. Examination of the cases reveals other explanations for
negative wills, however. Some testators indicate that they have already provid-
ed for disinherited heirs by lifetime gifts. 80 Others assert that disinherited heirs
have less need than the loved ones that testators have chosen to benefit under
their wills.81 In neither instance can we reliably infer that a testator would
want a negative will to become operative if and when a will proves incom-
plete. If a partial intestacy occurs because a residuary beneficiary
unexpectedly predeceased the testator, then that beneficiary no longer needs
the testator's largesse in priority over the disinherited heir. This change of cir-
cumstance raises the specter that the testator might want to revisit the share
going to the disinherited heir.82 Even if a testator dies partially intestate
77. Eulitt v. Little Sisters of the Poor (In re Estate of McKay), 98 N.W.2d 604, 605
(Mich. 1959); see also, e.g., In re Estate of Beu, 333 N.Y.S.2d 858, 858-59 (Sur. Ct. 1972)
(imposing a negative will on a daughter because "she has been disobedient and ungrateful"),
aff'd, 354 N.YS.2d 600 (App. Djv. 1974).
78. See, e.g., McElligott v. Murray (In re Estate of Connolly), 222 N.W.2d 885, 886-
87, 891-92 (Wis. 1974) (asserting the "attractiveness" of a power to give effect to a negative
will where the one at issue stemmed from hostility).
79. Strohm v. McMullen, 89 N.E.2d 383, 384, 387 (Ill. 1949), overruled in part on
other grounds by Schroeder v. Benz, 138 N.E.2d 496 (Ill. 1956).
80. E.g., Kula v. Kula, 31 N.W.2d 96, 98 (Neb. 1948); In re Estate of Lippner, 429
N.Y.S.2d 839, 841 (Sur. Ct. 1980).
81. E.g., In re Hittell, 75 P. at 53; In re Young, 232 N.Y.S. 427, 428 (Sur. Ct. 1928).
82. See, e.g., Kinahan v. Malone (In re Estate of Fritze), 259 P. 992, 993-94 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1927) ("[T]he testatrix did not anticipate the invalidity of her gift .... What her actu-
al intent may have been in [that] event ... we have no means of knowing .... [S]he might
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because she set out no residuary clause to begin with, this fact suggests that
she failed to foresee the value of the estate, part of which the testator may
have acquired after the will was executed. Reevaluation of the distribution
of the property unaccounted for by the will might cause the testator to
amend the amount going to the disinherited heir on the assumption that the
will covered everything. In the absence of hostility, such amendments of
intent grow more likely. Of course, in such a case, the will itself is unlikely
to reveal what revisions, if any, the testator would have made, but at least
these circumstances bring intent into question.
Still another explanation for negative wills in some instances is mistake.
Testators are now and then anxious to preclude unknown or as yet unborn
children from taking a share of an estate governed by a complete will under
pretermitted child statutes; in most states, these statutes set aside a share
(traditionally, an intestate share) of the estate for any child born after the
will is executed, or, in a minority of states, for any child, whenever born,
omitted without mention in the will.83 A testator can override these statutory
directives by explicit provision in the will, but in seeking to do so some tes-
tators express themselves imperfectly, using broader language _that
transforms the provision into a negative will. Hence, one can discover in the
case law a disinheriting provision that reads, "I have intentionally omitted to
provide herein for any of my heirs who are living at the time of my demise,
and to any person who shall successfully claim to be an heir of mine ... I
hereby bequeath the sum of ONE DOLLAR .... ."4 Quite possibly, the tes-
tator would not have intended this clause to pertain to known heirs, in the
event of a partial intestacy.
Bizarrely, the will of Vickie Lynn Marshall (also known as Anna Nicole
Smith) included such a provision, stating that "I have intentionally omitted
to provide for my spouse and other heirs, including future spouses and chil-
dren and other descendants now living and those hereafter born or
adopted,"85 even though she, as a woman, was incapable of having unknown
children.86 When her sole beneficiary (a son, Daniel) predeceased her at the
age of twenty, her afterborn, infant daughter, Dannielynn, was barred from
perhaps have given [the excess] to her sisters," whom she negatively disinherited because
"'each of them has plenty of this life's possessions.' "); Bray v. Bray, 269 N.E.2d 452, 453
(Mass. 1971) ("The court is left to conjecture as to whether the testatrix would have favored
cousins over her sister [who was disinherited by the will since she was not in need] had she
anticipated that her husband would predecease her."); see also, e.g., Kurrie v. Ky. Trust Co. of
Louisville, 194 S.W.2d 638, 640 (Ky. Ct. App. 1946) (suggesting that disinheriting language
should not be construed as intended to "inhibit any of [the] estate from going to ... the per-
sons named," when the testator stated that "the reason that he devised nothing to them was
because he knew bountiful provision already had been made for them").
83. WILLIAM M. McGOVERN ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES § 3.5 (4th ed. 2010).
84. Tomlinson v. Jennings (In re Estate of Tolman), 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 924, 925 (Ct.
App. 2010).
85. Will of Vickie Lynn Marshall art. I (July 30, 2001), available at http://
www.slideshare.net/LegalDocs/findlaw-anna-nicole-smith.
86. Perhaps Smith's Hollywood attorney had routinely included such clauses in the
wills he drafted for male actors and repeated the practice, unthinkingly, in this instance.
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her estate under the language of the will. But Dannielynn was lucky: she
could still take by intestacy, because negative wills are ineffective in Cali-
fornia, where Smith was domiciled.87 Doubtless, any other result would
have left Smith spinning in her grave.
Courts have had to confront these matters directly with regard to a relat-
ed issue. Suppose a beneficiary named in a will predeceases the testator.
Under modem antilapse statutes, if the late beneficiary was a close family
member, the bequest goes instead to her descendants if any survive, and
otherwise to the residuary beneficiary, unless the will provides for this con-
tingency. Now, suppose the will contains no contingency clause naming an
alternative taker in the event that a beneficiary predeceases the testator; but
the will does include a separate clause expressly disinheriting the descend-
ant of a beneficiary who, as events unfold, predeceases the testator. Because
a testator's will can countermand orders of distribution dictated by an anti-
lapse statute, 88 courts have a clear mandate to give effect to a negative will
insofar as it speaks to the distribution of the testamentary estate. But do
courts construe such clauses as intended to supersede the rules of antilapse?
In fact, most courts have ruled to the contrary. Some have observed that
a provision of this sort is not dispositive, because the beneficiary's prema-
ture death changes intent.89 Others have dismissed disinheriting clauses in
this situation as intended only to override pretermitted child statutes.90 The
inference that a beneficiary's death would cause a testator to withdraw a
negative will applicable to the beneficiary's descendant gains strength, logi-
cally in this scenario, because the testator must have realized that if the
beneficiary had survived, then (at least ordinarily) her descendant would
benefit indirectly from the bequest. When directed at the descendant of a
named beneficiary, a negative will can rarely serve any purpose other than to
underscore the testator's wish that the named beneficiary take first.9' Nega-
tive wills potentially applicable in instances of partial intestacy are not
confined to descendants of beneficiaries, of course, but the possibility (albeit
not a logical necessity) that changes of circumstance would have altered
87. E.g., Henderson v. Snow (In re Estate of Barnes), 407 P.2d 656, 659 (Cal. 1965).
The unpublished decision by the probate court in Los Angeles is briefly reported in Anna's
Daughter Named Sole Heir, GULF DAILY NEWS (March 6, 2008), http://www.gulf-daily-
news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=210754.
88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.5
cmts. f-i (1999).
89. E.g., Robison v. Tate (In re Estate of Carroll), 291 P.2d 976, 978-79 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1956).
90. E.g., Bruner v. First Nat'l Bank of Or. (In re Estate of Mack), 443 P.2d 645, 646
(Or. 1968). For discussions of the case law, see Susan F. French, Antilapse Statutes Are Blunt
Instruments: A Blueprint for Reform, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 335, 353-57 (1985), and Patricia J.
Roberts, Lapse Statutes: Recurring Construction Problems, 37 EMORY L.J. 323, 354-57
(1988).
91. Not so, however, if the beneficiary is estranged from her descendant, obviously an
exceptional case. For a case raising this possibility, see In re Estate of LeGates, 1979 WL
28986, at *1-2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 24, 1979).
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intent once again arises in this context, assuming the testator expressed no
hostility toward disinherited heirs.
All of which suggests that lawmakers toiling in this field have some-
thing to learn from empirical evidence. If hostility provokes the lion's
share of negative wills, then lawmakers can justify enforcement of these
provisions as a majoritarian, intent-effectuating rule. If hostility provokes
only a minority of negative wills, however, their enforcement becomes
problematic.
In order to gain insight into the distribution of motivations for negative
wills, I have striven to assemble a comprehensive data set of published
American cases, without restriction as to date, in which negative wills ap-
peared. I then examined each of those cases to determine the testator's
motive for disinheriting the heir (or heirs), as shown either by the will or
other evidence.92 The cases broke down as follows:
Hostility: 42 (20.4%)
Nonhostility: 53 (25.7%)
Unclear: 111 (53.9%)
Total: 206
And so, perhaps contrary to intuition, we find that hostility has figured
in a minority of the published cases where an explanation for a disinheriting
provision presents itself; other, benign considerations have induced more
negative wills. Looking exclusively at the cases in which we can discern the
testator's frame of mind, motivation proved nonhostile in 55.8 percent of the
cases and hostile in 44.2 percent. We cannot, therefore, safely assume, pace
the Uniform Probate Code and the Restatement, that a per se rule giving
effect to negative wills is more likely to correspond with the typical testa-
tor's intent than the common law's per se rule invalidating negative wills. To
make a blanket presumption here is, well, presumptuous.
Still, we must take care to note the limitations of these data. The data set
of informative cases turns out to be relatively small: ninety-five in all. As-
suming the cases account for a random sample of negative wills, the margin
of error is ± 10 percent. Accordingly, the data are not statistically significant
for the purpose of establishing that a majority of negative wills are nonhos-
92. The raw data are available on request from the author, The study tabulates all cases
in vhich a disinheriting provision for an heir appeared in the will, including those in which no
partial intestacy ensued. The study nevertheless excludes "disinherison" cases from Louisiana
in which testators have sought to deprive a descendant of the forced share (known as legitime)
because the only statutory grounds for doing so involve misbehavior by the descendant, result-
ing in hostility. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 1621 (2012); see also, e.g., Succession of Czindula,
751 So. 2d 986, 987-88 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (omitted from the data set). The study counts
cases, rather than individual disinherited heirs, as the units of data. In some instances, I have
inferred motivation from suggestive evidence, see infra notes 101, 105-106, 119 and accom-
panying text, but where evidence has appeared inconclusive, or occasionally conflicting, see,
e.g., In re Estate of Keamey, 9 N.Y.S.2d 290,293 (Sur. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 16 N.Y.S.2d 526 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1939), I have coded motivation as unclear.
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tile. Furthermore, we have reason to doubt the perfect randomness of the
data, even beyond the general sampling concerns raised earlier.93
First of all, quantitative reliance on manifestations of hostility or non-
hostility could skew the results in unpredictable ways. In other words,
hostility could prove unequally distributed between negative-will cases in
which we can detect evidence of either hostility or nonhostility, and those
cases in which we can detect nothing one way or the other about the motives
driving the testator-the second group representing over 54 percent of the
data set. One potential distortion arises from widespread estate-planning
practices. Estate planners typically advise testators against stating hurtful
rationales of any sort within the text of their wills.94 Hence, at least within
professionally drafted wills, expressions of hostile motivation may prove
underrepresented. At the same time, disinheriting provisions frequently
appear within homemade wills, prepared without the coolheaded advice of
counsel. Uncounseled testators might be less inclined to leave their motives
unsaid when hostility inspires a negative will. 95 In this regard, a data set
consisting of cases should provide fuller information than one consisting of
probated wills, since cases sometimes reveal evidence of motive beyond the
four walls of the wills they adjudicate. 96 Nevertheless, the cumulative impact
of any tendencies to downplay hostile motives remains unknown and
probably unknowable.
A second possible distortion is related to, but could tend to offset, the
first. If expressions of hostility are underrepresented in the language of
wills, they might prove overrepresented in cases about wills. Estate planners
counsel against including such a statement in a will, precisely because they
fear that the statement might trigger a contest once the will becomes a pub-
lic document. 97 This practical intuition commands some theoretical support.
Cognitive psychologists posit that "equity seeking" can overcome rational
economic incentives to settle cases, a phenomenon we would expect to see
escalate in emotionally charged cases. 98 The shock of a negative will cou-
pled with an overt statement of hostility could disincline a contestant to
settle a will contest, thereby increasing the likelihood that it generates an
opinion included in the data set. This distortion is confined to a data set of
cases, as opposed to probate records.
93. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
94. Judith G. McMullen, Keeping Peace in the Family While You Are Resting in Peace:
Making Sense of and Preventing Will Contests, 8 MARQ. ELDER'S ADVISOR 61, 85 (2006).
95. See, e.g., Eulitt v. Little Sisters of the Poor (In re Estate of McKay), 98 N.W.2d 604,
605 (Mich. 1959) ("[These heirs] never bother about me in life. So I remember them in
Death."). The court concluded from the language of this will that the "testatrix was poorly
schooled in spelling and grammar... ." Id. at 607.
96. See infra notes 102-103 and accompanying text.
97. McMullen, supra note 94, at 85-86.
98. See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settle-
ment: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REv. 107, 109-10, 117, 142-50 (1994); Jeffrey
J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 122,
174 (1996).
June 2013] 1443
Michigan Law Review
All told, our confidence in these data as a precise indicator of the distri-
bution of motives for negative wills remains open to doubt. Applied as a
rough barometer, the data nonetheless suggest substantial scattering of tes-
tamentary motives. The absence of a predominant cause for negative wills
gives rise to heterogeneity that neither the common law nor the model laws,
located at either end of the doctrinal spectrum, make any attempt to cope
with.
Can we locate a via media between the two extremes? Rather than fol-
low a per se rule, why not grant courts authority to assess the impact of a
negative will on a case-by-case basis, taking into account both intrinsic and
extrinsic evidence? Such an approach offers the advantage of fine-tuning
judicial outcomes to intent, which the data suggest is likely to vary from
testator to testator.99 Such an approach also acknowledges our uncertainties
about the reliability of the available empirical evidence, which weakens our
ability to certify which of the fixed alternatives would comprise the majori-
tarian rule.
At the same time, evidence of testamentary intent concerning a negative
will in a given case may emerge from any number of sources. In some in-
stances, the will itself may disclose the presence (or absence) of hostile
intent, whether expressly' 00 or by reasonable inference from the language
used. When, for example, a testator stipulates that specified heirs "shall not
receive one penny of my estate," hostility appears manifest.' If a will was
professionally drafted, the attorney scrivener (or her notes) may provide
insight into what led the testator to execute a negative will.102 Likewise, tes-
timony by family members or other acquaintances could shed light on the
99. Such a rule would also afford courts an opportunity to take into consideration evi-
dence of changes in attitude, as where a testator and beneficiary, alienated from one another at
the time when a will containing a disinheriting provision was executed, subsequently recon-
ciled. See Hammer v. Hammer, 633 S.E.2d 878, 880-81 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (where such a
reconciliation occurred, but where the disinheriting provision appeared only within an inoper-
ative, conditional section of the will).
100. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
101. In re Hefner's Will, 122 N.Y.S.2d 252, 253 (Sur. Ct. 1953) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also, e.g., Phelps v. Stoner's Adm'r, 212 S.W. 423, 424 (Ky. 1919) (simi-
lar language); Nevada v. Palm (In re Estate of Melton), 272 P.3d 668, 671-72 (Nev. 2012)
(similar language); In re Estate of Stewart, 304 A.2d 361, 362 (N.H. 1973) (exhorting the
unrelated residuary beneficiary not to assign any part of her inheritance to any of the testator's
relatives). Some courts have drawn such inferences. E.g., In re Estate of Alexander, 395
N.YS.2d 598, 600 (Sur. Ct. 1977) ("There are no expressions of affection for the son in the
testator's will; indeed, he does not refer to his son as 'beloved' as he does his other legatees,
including his chauffeur."). Vice versa, the language in some wills supports the opposite infer-
ence. See, e.g., Rosnow v. Rosnow (In re Will of Rosnow), 78 N.W.2d 750, 750 (Wis. 1956)
("I hereby mention the name of my son ... in loving remembrance, it being my will that he
shall share in no part of this my estate." (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also In re
Davies' Will, 185 N.W. 578, 579 (Iowa 1921) (similar language).
102. E.g., In re Estate of Jetter, 570 N.W.2d 26, 32 (S.D. 1997) (introducing the drafting
attorney's notes into evidence); McElligott v. Murray (In re Estate of Connolly), 222 N.W.2d
885, 887 (Wis. 1974) (introducing the drafting attorney's recollection of the decedent's ra-
tionale into evidence).
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testator's motives.° 3 Alternatively, aspects of the estate plan may themselves
betray the testator's sentiments. If, for example, a testator makes a bequest
to a beneficiary but then adds a direction that she is to receive "no more"
than that-what we earlier distinguished as a limiting will'°4-and the sum
bequeathed is substantial, that fact alone bespeaks nonhostility. 0 5 Other-
wise, presumably, the testator would have left the beneficiary nothing.
Similarly, if a testator imposes a negative will on an heir but nevertheless
provides a bequest to her under some circumstances, that qualification can
suggest the absence of hostility toward the heir.10 6
Still, a court is left to decide how to treat nonhostile negative wills,
whose enforcement might or might not reflect the testator's preferences. A
court could again seek to ferret out intent case by case, but in the absence of
any further evidence of how the circumstances that brought about the partial
intestacy would have affected intent, what sorts of inferences might a court
reasonably draw? Whatever the cause of a partial intestacy, where the alter-
native taker is less closely related genealogically to the testator than the
disinherited heir, a court could reasonably assume the absence of intent to
give effect to a nonhostile negative will, given the tendency of most persons
to favor nearer relatives over more distant ones-an assumption made
throughout intestacy law. So, for example, if a testator were expressly to
disinherit one of two children, explaining the negative will not on the basis
of hostility but rather on her relative lack of need or on prior transfers made
to her, then the death of the beneficiary-child resulting in a partial intestacy
should not trigger the negative will, in the absence of other evidence, if the
alternative heir were, for instance, a cousin of the testator."°7
Lawmakers would still need to set a rebuttable presumption about the
testator's intent to make a negative will effective vel non, where a court finds
no evidence of intent one way or the other. Existing empirical evidence fails
to reveal what the presumption should be because courts have not previously
relied on case-specific indications of intent to resolve the effectiveness of
103. E.g., Sec. Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Kulp (In re Estate of Flint), 102 Cal. Rptr. 345, 349
(Ct. App. 1972); Zimmerman v. Hafer, 32 A. 316, 317 (Md. 1895) (testimony held inadmissi-
ble); Branscombe v. Jenks, 387 N.E.2d 215, 216 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979); Hurst v. Von de Veld,
58 S.W. 1056, 1057-58 (Mo. 1900) (testimony held inadmissible); West v. Myrvik (In re Es-
tate of Samuelson), 757 N.W.2d 44, 46 (N.D. 2008); Najvar v. Vasek, 564 S.W.2d 202, 207
(Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
104. See supra text following note 45.
105. See, e.g., Marinos v. Marinos (In re Marinos' Estate), 102 P.2d 443, 444 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1940) ("Four Thousand ($4,000.00) Dollars, and no more"); Doherty v. Grady, 72 A.
869, 870 (Me. 1908) ("forty thousand dollars, and no more").
106. See, e.g., In re Estate of Kronen, 496 N.E.2d 678, 679 (N.Y. 1986) (disinheriting
children "for reasons best known to me," but adding that if the testator and his spouse died in a
common calamity, those same children would take the entire estate). But cf Graydon's Ex'rs v.
Graydon, 25 N.J. Eq. 561, 562 (1874) (concerning a conditional negative will, where the
beneficiary engaged in the behavior-marriage to a named party before a specified date-that
triggered the negative will).
107. For a case featuring similar facts, see Bray v. Bray, 269 N.E.2d 452, 453 (Mass.
1971), quoted supra note 82.
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negative wills. At least in the short term, the rebuttable presumption must
be set arbitrarily. But once enough cases decided under the new rule
accumulate, a follow-up empirical study might reveal patterns that could,
on reevaluation, inform our formulation of the applicable presumption.
2. Ancillary Issues
a. Global Disinheritance
In the course of reforming the law of negative wills, states and model
lawmakers have had to address a number of additional issues. One of these
is the treatment of disinheriting provisions that apply not to discrete heirs
but to all heirs: "I have intentionally omitted the names of any of my rela-
tives from this ... will,"'' 8 or words to that effect. In such a case, enforcing
a negative will in the event of a partial intestacy would cause a portion of the
estate to escheat to the state.
Neither the Uniform Probate Code nor the Restatement distinguishes
global from discrete negative wills. 1°9 From the beginning, though, British
courts electing to give effect to negative wills carved out an exception for
those resulting in an escheat, which the courts invalidated. Hence, "by mak-
ing the declaration of exclusion.., too extensive, it becomes inoperative."' 10
One American court, construing a South Dakota statute authorizing negative
wills, held that the statute-although based on the Uniform Probate Code-
implicitly incorporated the British exception nullifying global negative
wills."' The Code's Reporter subsequently challenged this reading as "un-
fortunate[] ' 112 and, in his dual capacity as Reporter for the Restatement, he
added language calling for the enforcement of a global negative will."3
108. E.g., Chuhak v. First Nat'l Bank of Cicero (In re Estate of Cancik), 476 N.E.2d 738,
739 (Ill. 1985); see also, e.g., Glenn v. Roberts, 95 So. 3d 271, 272 (Fla, Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
109. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101(b) (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 43 (Supp.
2012); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.7 (1999).
110. Lett v. Randall, (1855) 107 Rev. Rep. 26 (Ch.) 30-31; 3 Sm. & G. 83, 89 (dicta).
This distinction is reiterated in the most recent British case on point. See Landolt v. Wynn (Re
Wynn), [1983] 3 All E.R. 310 (Ch.) at 314 (dicta). For early American discussions, see Doe ex
dem. Hoyle v. Stowe, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 318, 323-24 (1830) (suggesting that a negative will is
effective so long as other heirs exist to replace any disinherited heirs), and Blackman v. Gor-
don, 19 S.C. Eq. (2 Rich. Eq.) 43,45 (App. Eq. 1845) (deeming a global negative will void).
111. In re Estate of Jetter, 570 N.W.2d 26, 28-30 (S.D. 1997).
112. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.7
reporter's note (1999). The court in In re Jetter emphasized (1) that the Code expressly author-
izes courts to fill in gaps with "law and equity," (2) that the section giving effect to negative
wills allows them to cover "an individual or class" and that the term "class" may not encom-
pass a negative will directed at all heirs, and (3) that under another section of the Code
adopted in South Dakota, escheat occurs only if no heir can be "found." 570 N.W.2d at 28-30
(internal quotation marks omitted). At least as a matter of statutory construction, the court's
analysis is far from compelling and, as the dissent complained, contradicted the "plain lan-
guage of [the statute]." Id. at 34 (DeVine, J., dissenting).
113. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.7
cmt. a (1999).
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More recent cases applying negative will statutes in Colorado and Nevada
have now taken that approach, enforcing negative wills that operated to dis-
inherit all heirs apart from named beneficiaries. 1 4 One of these holdings
remains dependent on whether a partial intestacy ensues under the terms of
a future interest created by the will. 15 In the other case, where the negative
will took effect at once, the court declared that the testator's $3 million es-
tate had escheated to the state, citing the Restatement's contention that
global negative wills should operate no differently from those covering dis-
crete heirs." 16
From a policy perspective, we have cause to doubt whether scrupulous
observance of global negative wills would likely correspond with testamen-
tary intent. Clauses of this sort often look suspiciously like ones designed to
avoid the application of a pretermitted child statute, as opposed to the intes-
tacy statute. They may well reflect artless drafting, misstating intent. 17 To
the extent that the author of a global negative will did truly aim to exclude
all heirs, and not just nonmarital descendants, it stands to reason that the
provision ordinarily traces to feelings of hostility-what else could inspire a
testator to disinherit all of her relations?1 ' Nevertheless, like other emo-
tions, hostility is not unqualified; people experience gradations of hostility.
As it diminishes, hostility shades into indifference, a phenomenon percepti-
ble within negative wills. Some global negative wills have stemmed from
little more than genealogical distance or from the absence of social interac-
tion, as opposed to overt conflict: "I ... have no relatives who are more
closely related to me than those of first cousins. I do not feel any particular
affection for any of [them] .... nor do I feel that any of them is entitled to
be the recipient of any of my bounty ....,"119 A testator's reluctance to
114. See Walter v. Walter (In re Estate of Walter), 97 P,3d 188, 191-92 (Colo. App.
2003); In re Estate of Melton, 272 P.3d 668, 671 (Nev. 2012).
115. In re Walter, 97 P.3d at 190-92.
116. In re Melton, 272 P.3d at 671, 680-81. See also Feitler v. LaChance (In re Estate of
Krokowsky), 896 E2d 247, 249 n.2 (Ariz. 1995) (assuming in dicta that a global negative will
can take effect under the Uniform Probate Code).
117. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text; see also Bank v. Union Bank (In re
Estate of Bank), 56 Cal. Rptr. 559, 561-63 (Ct. App. 1967) (finding that a global negative will
sufficed to override the pretermitted child statute); Benolken v. Johnson (In re Benolken's
Estate), 205 P.2d 1141, 1146-47 (Mont. 1949) (same); In re Jetter, 570 N.W.2d at 31-33
(suggesting that the clause was probably intended only to preclude claims by other "known
and unknown relatives" that they were mistakenly omitted from the will).
118. But for an exception, see Eastminister Presbyterian Church v. Thompson (In re
Estate of Jackson), 793 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (quoting a will disinheriting
"[all] of my relatives ... because they are all financially secure in their own right and do not
need any little thing I have to offer," and maintaining that "[t]hey now have and always had
my love... with many gifts at times during my days of living").
119. In re Estate of Stoffel, 459 N.Y.S.2d 707, 709 (Sur. Ct. 1983) (emphasis omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Chuhak v. First Nat'l Bank of Cicero (In re
Estate of Cancik), 476 N.E.2d 738, 739-40 (Ill. 1985) (concerning a global negative will
covering heirs who resided in Czechoslovakia); lozapavichus v. Fournier, 308 A.2d 573, 574
(Me. 1973) ("[T]here is no suggestion that any contacts were ever established ...."'); In re
Martin's Will, 95 N.YS.2d 260, 261 (Sur. Ct. 1949) ("I do not have any blood relatives that I
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provide for such heirs is understandable. Still, when presented with a choice
between leaving property to them or to the state, via the doctrine of escheat,
when a will proves incomplete, how many testators would prefer to let stand
a global negative will? Even in the presence of hostility, one court regarded
such a preference as "bizarre."'120 We cannot dismiss out of hand the possi-
bility that the animosities of some testators run that deep, and for that reason
lawmakers should not invalidate global negative wills as a matter of law. But
given their draconian consequences, global negative wills should be viewed
with a skeptical eye. Reflecting that skepticism, lawmakers should create a
rebuttable presumption that a testator intends to withdraw a global negative
will in the event of an (unanticipated) partial intestacy, whatever presump-
tion they otherwise apply to negative wills covering discrete heirs.
b. Construction
Then there is the matter of textual construction. Both the Uniform Pro-
bate Code and the Restatement acknowledge that the language of negative
wills can take many forms.'21 Nevertheless, under both the Code and the
Restatement, a court can enforce a negative will only if it appears "express-
ly" in a testamentary instrument;' a court cannot find a negative will by
implication.
This limitation appears too rigid to effectuate intent. Particularly when
presented with estate plans drafted by laypersons, courts need a free hand to
construe clumsy language more flexibly. A recent case applying a negative
will statute based on the Uniform Probate Code illustrates the problem: a
testator disinherited "[a]ll of my heirs not mentioned in this will.' 123 The
know of and if there should be any ... none of my estate is to go to any such relatives...."
(internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Will of Penrose, 47 N.Y.S.2d 732, 733 (Sur. Ct.
1944) (similar statement). But cf In re Estate of Stewart, 304 A.2d 361, 362 (N.H. 1973)
(reporting a global negative will coupled with an instruction to the unrelated residuary
beneficiary that "it be understood that [she] is not to assign any interest she may take in this
will to any of my relatives" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
120. In re Jetter, 570 N.W.2d at 31 (quoting the heirs' brief) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The dissent, however, disagreed. See id. at 35-36 (DeVine, J., dissenting). See also
Henderson v. Snow (In re Estate of Barnes), 407 P.2d 656, 659 (Cal. 1965) (observing that a
testator might prefer to relax a global negative will had she anticipated that the sole benefi-
ciary would have predeceased her). But cf In re Walter, 97 P.3d at 192 (failing to explore the
facts that prompted the testator to include the global negative will, and conceding that the
testator "may not have intended that his estate would escheat," but insisting that the court was
"limited by the clear and plain meaning of his words"); In re Melton, 272 P.3d at 677 (failing
to explore the facts and rejecting the suggestion that the prior death of the intended beneficiary
would have changed the testator's intent to disinherit his relatives as "speculat[ion]").
121. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101 cmt. (amended 2010), 8 pt. I U.L.A. 43 (Supp.
2012); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.7 cmt. b
(1999).
122. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101(b) (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 43 (Supp. 2012);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.7 (1999).
123. Hartvickson v. Haugen (In re Estate of Haugen), 794 N.W.2d 448, 451 (N.D. 2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
1448 [Vol. 111: 1423
Incomplete Wills
testator's sole heir under the intestacy statute was his spouse, whom the will
did mention-but only by way of noting that the testator had filed for di-
vorce from her, presumably to explain why the testator left her nothing
under the will. 124 The court acknowledged that this language "creat[es] un-
certainty" about whether the testator intended to exclude his spouse under
the negative will. 125 Nevertheless, the Code's strict form of negative will
statute "requires express language, not just uncertainty," to disinherit an
heir.126 The spouse was permitted to take under the intestacy statute, despite
the testator's insinuation that he intended-perhaps more adamantly than
with regard to any other relative-to disinherit her.12
7
Limiting wills raise similar construction problems. Under the Code and
the Restatement, a bequest of "$50... and no more" disqualifies the benefi-
ciary as an heir by partial intestacy; but "[w]ithout the phrase 'and no more,'
the provision would not prevent [the beneficiary] from taking his intestate
share."'28 In the first instance, the limiting will is express; in the second, it is
not.
Once again, this approach is too literal to capture imperfect expressions
of intent by lay drafters. Of course, if a testator bequeaths a substantial but
specified sum, indicative of a benevolent intent, without including the
phrase "and no more," no inference of intent to limit the beneficiary's inher-
itance in the event of a partial intestacy would be warranted. 12 9 But if a
testator bequeaths a nominal sum to a beneficiary-a few dollars or, prover-
bially, a single dollar-then tacking on the phrase "and no more" appears
redundant. From the beginning, courts faced with nominal bequests have
interpreted them as attempts in common discourse to create negative wills,
whether or not valid under state law.'30 Such a provision appears "not as a
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at451-52.
128. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.7
cmt. b (1999); see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101 cmt. (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A.
43-44 (Supp. 2012).
129. Quattlebaum v. Simmons Nat'l Bank of Pine Bluff, 184 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Ark.
1945). Arguendo, an exception might be made in the case of a bequest of a life estate: the
bequest of a life estate could imply an intent to exclude the life tenant from the remainder
interest if it is distributed by partial intestacy, even without the words "a life estate and no
more." Compare, e.g., Walters v. Neafus, 125 S.W. 167, 169 (Ky. 1910) ("One could scarcely
be a remainderman to his own life estate."), and Bragg v. Litchfield, 98 N.E. 673, 675-76
(Mass. 1912) (finding an intent to exclude the life tenant from the remainder by "unavoidable
inference"), with, e.g., Nat'l Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Zink, 196 N.E.2d 917, 918 (Mass.
1964) (finding no such inference), Langlois v. Langlois, 93 N.E.2d 264, 266 (Mass. 1950)
(same), and Reid v. Whitfield (In re Estate of Reid), 399 So. 2d 1032, 1033 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981) (finding that the life tenant under a will could take the remainder by partial intes-
tacy because "intent is no longer controlling" when intestacy ensues).
130. Denn v. Gaskin, (1777) 98 Eng. Rep. 1292 (K.B.) 1294; 2 Cowp. 657, 660 (constru-
ing a bequest of ten shillings as a "disinheriting legacy" but holding that it was ineffective to
foreclose inheritance by partial intestacy).
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bequest, but as a token of disinheritance,'1 31 as defined "by well-known cus-
tom and connotation."'' 32 In some instances, wills including nominal
bequests have gone on to spell out the testator's hostility toward the nominal
beneficiary in no uncertain terms, and the formula itself seems almost to
breathe resentment-adding insult to penury. 3 3 To deny that nominal be-
quests qualify as negative wills because they lack express words of
disinheritance is to ignore this idiomatic reality.
To be sure, the distinction between a nominal and substantial bequest is
one of degree, and where along the continuum of ascending bequests the
implication of disinheritance disappears remains vague. 134 But vagueness
does not render a rule unworkable-it simply turns it into a standard applied
with greater latitude. 35 Courts have discretion to find negative wills as an
implicit attribute of nominal bequests under nonuniform negative will
statutes, none of which requires a testator to employ express language of
131. Frayssinous v. Brugnoli (Estate of Frinchaboy), 238 P.2d 592, 594 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1951).
132. Trinity Methodist Church v. Moore (In re Estate of Moore), 33 Cal. Rptr. 427,
429-30 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); see also, e.g., Rufty v. Brantly, 161 S.W.2d 11, 14 (Ark.
1942) (indicating that a nominal bequest is "the usual and ordinary means of disinheriting
one, who would otherwise be an heir"); Appeal of Scully, 98 A. 350, 353 (Conn. 1916)
("The gift of $5 in an estate of [these] proportions ... is a method of practically disinheriting
.. . '); In re Estate of Skwarlo, No. 3135 K-33, 2001 WL 312451, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 12,
2001) ("[T]his one dollar bequest appears to be a nominal sum which was intended to disin-
herit the individual named."); Lawnick v. Schultz, 28 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Mo. 1930) ("[T]he
amount of the legacy [$5] ... was tantamount ... to a virtual disinheritance... "); Skinner v.
McCormick, 162 A.2d 577, 581 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960) ("[Dlecedent ... cut [recipi-
ent] off with a legacy of one dollar, thereby indicating that [the recipient] was not to receive
any part of [the] estate."); In re Estate of Eckart, 348 N.E.2d 905, 907 (N.Y. 1976) ("[T]he
grant of a nominal bequest to a close relation is the more accepted or customary way of indi-
cating an intent to disinherit."); In re Estate of Newkirk, 383 N.Y.S.2d 466, 468 (Sur. Ct.
1974) ("[T]he ... bequest ... [is] so De minimis [sic] as to establish testratrix's strong intent
to effectually disinherit petitioner."); In re Forde, 108 N.YS.2d 715, 716 (Sur. Ct. 1951) ("The
nominal bequests... would seem to indicate an intent to disinherit .. "), aff'd, 117 N.YS.2d
484 (N.Y App. Div. 1952).
133. E.g., In re Estate of Watts (1933) 6 M.P.R. 47, 50 (Can. N.B. S.C.) (quoting a will
that described a bequest of $1 "as [a] memento of the manner in which my husband treated me
during our married life" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also, e.g., Sec. Pac. Nat'l
Bank v. Kulp (In re Estate of Flint), 102 Cal. Rptr. 345, 347-49 (Ct. App. 1972) (involving a
nominal bequest where extrinsic evidence demonstrated hostility); Hoffman v. Arnold, 209
S.W. 506, 507 (Ky. 1919) (involving a will that expressed hostility); Branscombe v. Jenks, 387
N.E.2d 215, 215-16 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (involving a nominal bequest where extrinsic evi-
dence showed hostility).
134. One court cited this vagueness as a reason not to impute an intended limitation:
It is argued that ... a legacy of $5 [to each child] ... signifies an intent ... that they
were to be limited[] in what they should receive .... But it might as well be argued that
[other] children were.., given all the personal property... and that, therefore, this indi-
cates that ... they should not receive more.
Hunter v. Miller, 190 N.W. 583, 585 (Neb. 1922).
135. For a related discussion, see Adam J. Hirsch & Gregory Mitchell, Law and Proximi-
ty, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 557, 591-92.
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disinheritance.'36 The Code and the Restatement alone see fit to impose a
stricter rule of construction.
c. Devolution
What alternative devolution ensues from enforcing a negative will? Un-
der both the Uniform Probate Code's statutory rule and the Restatement's
proposed judicial rule, disinherited heirs are treated as if they disclaimed
their intestate shares; hence, they take nothing, apart from any capped be-
quest granted them under a limiting will. 37 At the same time, under the law
of disclaimers, any surviving descendants of disinherited heirs ordinarily
take in their place, succeeding to their shares of the partially intestate es-
tate.138
Neither the Code nor the Restatement spells out the rationale for this
rule, and we need to consider whether it is likely to correspond with the in-
tent of the typical testator. Under the law of intestacy, when an heir (other
than the decedent's spouse) predeceases the decedent, her descendants in-
herit in her shoes by right of "representation," under the theory that a
decedent's social bonds to heirs extend to family members of lower genera-
tions. Heirs of the higher generation supersede lower ones because
decedents expect heirs to provide for their descendants in turn; but if heirs
are unavailable to take, their descendants replace them in the eyes of the
typical decedent. 3 9 The question raised here is whether the opposite also
holds true: In other words, if a decedent disinherits an heir, would the
decedent's expression of negative intent extend to that heir's descendants, by
virtue of their close association?
On the one hand, we might assume that if a testator wished to disinherit
the descendants of heirs, she could convey that intent expressly, by expand-
ing the scope of the negative will: "My child, A, and A's descendants, are to
take no part of my estate."'" In that event, both A and A's descendants are
136. Estate of Flink, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 28, 2002, at 21 (Sur. Ct.); see also N.Y. EST. POWERS
& TRUSTS LAW § 1-2.19 (McKinney 2012); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 3(ff), 58(b)(1) (West
2012); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 852.10 (West 2002).
137. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101(b) (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 43 (Supp. 2012);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.7 cmt. c (1999).
138. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-1106(b)(3)(B) (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 285 "
(Supp. 2012). If a testator disinherits her spouse, the spouse's descendants who are also de-
scended from the testator comprise alternative heirs, but the spouse's descendants from
another marriage or relationship do not, unless no other blood heirs survive. See id. § 2-
103(a)(1) & (b), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 48 (Supp. 2012).
139. McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 83, § 2.2, at 54-55. For the sake of simplicity, I
refer here (and hereinafter) to a predeceasing "heir." Strictly speaking, she constitutes an
"heir-apparent."
140. E.g., In re Klopsch's Estate, 125 N.Y.S.2d 320, 323 (Sur. Ct. 1951) ("The testatrix
stated in her will a purpose to make no provision for her son ... or his issue ...." (emphasis
added)); Waller v. Sproles, 22 S.W.2d 4, 4 (Tenn. 1929) ("[O]ne dollar... each.. . is all that I
intend for them or their heirs to have of my estate ...." (emphasis added) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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treated as if they disclaimed, reallocating the partially intestate estate to oth-
er lines of children, if any, or to collateral relatives. On the other hand, when
negative wills appear in homemade testamentary instruments, as they so
often do, we cannot count on unsophisticated drafters to express themselves
that precisely. A lay testator might intend a provision disinheriting an heir to
excise her without substituting descendants in her place-implicitly expand-
ing the negative will to cover descendants of disinherited heirs. At the very
least, either this approach or the one advocated in the Code and Restatement
appears a plausible way to read a negative will drafted by a layperson.
Courts have faced a similar issue when construing disinheriting provi-
sions that operate to override pretermitted heir statutes. Under some of those
statutes, if a child omitted from a will predeceases the testator, leaving de-
scendants, those descendants can claim the predeceasing child's
pretermitted share.' 4 ' But if the will expressly disinherits a child who prede-
ceases, without also referring to that child's descendants, a majority of
courts nevertheless have denied descendants the right to claim as pretermit-
ted heirs.'42 This rule extends disinheriting provisions for pretermitted heirs
by implication to the descendants of those heirs.
Whether the same implication should accompany negative wills that re-
shape intestate shares demands analysis. Again, the best way to pursue the
problem is to contemplate testators' possible motives for making negative
wills and the distributive preferences that seem likely to follow from those
motives. If a testator harbors feelings of hostility toward an heir and disin-
herits the heir for that reason, it is entirely possible, albeit not certain, that
those feelings would extend to the heir's descendants. It all depends on the
nature of their relationship. When the disinherited heir happens to be the
testator's spouse, and her descendants are also his descendants, we cannot
assume that hostility toward the spouse would spill over to their children.
But when the negative will covers a blood heir, and the testator has no inde-
pendent connection with descendants of that blood heir, the prospect of
hostility by association grows larger. The Uniform Probate Code makes a
similar inference in connection with the implied revocation of bequests to
former spouses. Under the Code, bequests to stepchildren and other relatives
of a former spouse are likewise impliedly revoked, on the theory that those
relatives "are likely to side with the former spouse, breaking down ...
[their] ties" to the testator.143 Is it not logical to assume, by analogy, that
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 34.2 statutory notes 2,
4 (1992) (not addressed in the third Restatement).
142. For collections of cases, see E.W.H., Annotation, Disinheritance Provision of Will
as Affecting Construction of Will as Regards Children or Descendants of Person Disinherited,
112 A.L.R. 284 passim (1938), and L.S. Tellier, Annotation, What, Other Than Express Disin-
heritance or Bequest, Avoids Application of Statute for Benefit of Pretermitted or After-Born
Children, 170 A.L.R. 1317, at 1330-34 (1943). Professor Atkinson endorsed this approach.
THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 143 n.23 (1953).
143. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804 & cmt., (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 233, 236
(Supp. 2012).
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descendants of a disinherited blood heir will "side" with their parent in her
feud with the testator?
If a negative will traces to the testator's inter vivos transfers to an heir or
to the testator's assessment that one heir has less need than others, an im-
plicit intent to broaden the negative will to include descendants of the
disinherited heir again remains a distinct possibility, if not a certainty. Either
way, the testator might well expect the disinherited heir to provide in turn
for her descendants. Under that assumption, treating descendants of a disin-
herited heir as substitute takers would defeat the testator's purpose of
achieving equality of distributions to, or greater material equality among,
heirs. 144
In short, the rule establishing the consequences of a negative will advo-
cated by the Code and the Restatement appears suspect. In New York, where
negative wills are effective under less detailed nonuniform legislation,
courts claim discretion to allocate the intestate shares of disinherited heirs
either to their descendants or to the other heirs, as guided by the "facts and
circumstances" of each case. 145 Given our uncertainty about intent when we
examine the will alone, the approach taken in New York appears reasonable.
At the outset, we would still need to establish an arbitrary default rule of
construction concerning the consequence of a negative will where no evi-
dence appears at all, but over time we might accumulate a sufficient data set
of cases from which to make an empirical judgment about what default rule
is more likely to effectuate intent with regard to the issue of devolution.
A subsidiary issue arises from the possibility that a disinherited heir
might predecease the testator. In that event, under both the Code and the
Restatement, the rules of representation in intestacy take precedence, and
the negative will ceases to apply. 14 Once again, the model lawmakers fail to
articulate any rationale for this wrinkle; and again, its conformity with intent
appears doubtful.
Consider how the rule might operate in conjunction with the doctrine
prevailing in New York that negative wills function, at a court's discretion,
to excise a named heir, rather than treat her as a disclaimant 47 If a negative
will took effect under this rule, then the heir's whole line could lose its op-
portunity to inherit from the testator. But under the approach suggested by
144. See Hittell v. Greer (In re Estate of Hittell), 75 P. 53, 53 (Cal. 1903) (quoting a will
stating that "I give nothing to my brother... because I suppose him to be rich; I give nothing
to any of his children ... because he can provide for them" (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)); Lane v. Patterson, 76 S.E. 47, 47 (Ga. 1912) (quoting a will stating that "[h]aving fully
provided for my deceased daughter. . . in her lifetime ... I make no provision or bequest to
her children" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
145. E.g., In re Estate of Stoffel, 459 N.Y.S.2d 707, 710 (Sur. Ct. 1983); see also Mad-
dock v. Haines, 88 F.2d 350, 352-53 (7th Cir. 1937) (assuming that a testator would want to
include the descendants of a disinherited child within the scope of a negative will).
146. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101(b) & cmt. (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 43 (Supp.
2012); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.7 illus. 1
(1999).
147. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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the Code and Restatement, if a disinherited heir happened to predecease the
testator, then we would ignore the negative will, and descendants of that
predeceased, disinherited heir could still take as heirs of the testator by right
of representation if a partial intestacy came to pass. Yet, once we determine
that a negative will implicitly extends to descendants of the disinherited heir,
we have little reason to assume that the testator's intent to disinherit an heir
of the lower generation would depend on the survival vel non of the disin-
herited heir in the higher generation.
To clarify this point, recall the empirically common explanations for a
negative will. If the negative will stemmed either from the testator's prior
transfers to the heir or from the heir's lack of need, then the testator can an-
ticipate that heirs of the lower generation will inherit in turn from the heir of
the higher generation. 148 Heirs of the lower generation wind up in the same,
superior financial position whether they inherit from their parent during the
testator's lifetime (by virtue of their parent's prior death) or following the
testator's death. If the negative will stemmed from hostility toward the heir,
we again have no reason to assume that the timing of the disinherited heir's
death would affect the testator's ties to the descendants of that heir. 149 To be
sure, the death of the heir during the testator's lifetime could conceivably
lead to a rapprochement between the testator and the late heir's descendants.
But by treating the enforceability and distributive consequences of a nega-
tive will as issues to be decided case by case on the basis of extrinsic
evidence, we would ensure that courts retain discretion to take such a heal-
ing of the family divide into account when ordering distribution of the
estate.150
None of this analysis changes fundamentally under the Code's (and the
Restatement's) different rule that descendants substitute for disinherited
heirs, although in most cases the issue dissolves into insignificance within
the model laws. Under the Code, descendants take in place of a disinherited
heir if she predeceases the testator, in which case the rules of representation
apply, and also if she survives the testator, in which case the rules of dis-
claimer apply.'5 ' At the same time, the shares going to descendants in each
instance do not invariably correspond under the Code. When an heir prede-
ceases the decedent under the rules of representation, the Code provides for
an equal division among descendants at each generational level at which at
least one heir survives. 52 Hence, for example, suppose a decedent had two
148. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
149. Again by analogy, if a testator executes a will making bequests to stepchildren or
other relatives of the testator's spouse, and the testator subsequently gets divorced from that
spouse, under the Code we assume that the testator intends to disinherit the stepchildren and
other affines included in the predissolution will. This assumption does not change under the
Code if the former spouse predeceases the testator. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(b)
(amended 2010), 8 pt. I U.L.A. 233 (Supp. 2012).
150. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
151. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-101(b), 2-1106(b)(3)(B) (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A.
43,284 (Supp. 2012).
152. Id. § 2-106, 8 pt. I U.L.A. 51 (Supp. 2012).
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children, A and B. A, in turn, had two children, C and D, while B had only
one child, E. If A survived the decedent and B predeceased, then under the
rules of representation A would receive one-half of the children's share of
the intestate estate, while E (as B's representative) would also take one-half
of that part of the estate. But if both A and B predeceased the decedent so
that neither could take as an heir, then the Code would treat each grandchild
equally, and C, D, and E would each take one-third of the children's share of
the intestate estate. 53
That is not, however, how descendants "represent" disinherited heirs.
Under the Code as well as the Restatement, surviving disinherited heirs are
deemed not to have constructively predeceased the testator but rather to have
constructively disclaimed their intestate shares. 54 In the scenario just raised,
if B predeceased the testator who also disinherited the surviving child A un-
der an incomplete will, so that once again neither A nor B could take as an
heir, A's one-half share would now be treated as if A had disclaimed, so that
C and D would each take one-quarter, while E would take one-half. If, by
contrast, the Code were to treat a disinherited heir as constructively prede-
ceasing the testator, then the descendants of A would collectively take a
greater fraction, totaling two-thirds, and the descendant of B would take
less, viz., one-third.
The drafters of the Code appear intuitively to have surmised that this re-
sult would conflict with probable intent: by hypothesis, a testator who
imposes a negative will on an heir is unlikely to want the heir's descendants
potentially to inherit a larger share than they would eventually take if the
testator had left standing the heir's intestacy rights. Yet, under the Code as
currently structured, descendants of a disinherited heir (A) can inherit more
if the disinherited heir predeceases the testator (one-third to C, one-third to
D, and one-third to E, in our example) than if the disinherited heir survives
the testator (one-quarter to C, one-quarter to D, and one-half to E, in our
example). If the drafters of the Code contemplated this seemingly perverse
disparity and have in mind a rationale to justify it, then they ought to articu-
late their reasoning in the accompanying comment.
3. Estate Planning Gimmickry
A review of negative will cases historically shows that they raise tech-
nical as well as policy issues. A negative will can figure into schemes to
accomplish estate planning objectives separate and apart from the goal of
disinheritance. Focused on that goal, statutory drafters have almost certainly
overlooked potential misapplications, and a well-drafted statute authorizing
negative wills ought to preclude parties from using the device for any pur-
pose other than the intended one of modifying substantive succession rights;
lawmakers might sanction other purposes, of course, but they demand inde-
pendent appraisal of public policy.
153. See id. § 2-106 & cmt.
154. See supra note 137.
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The principal unsanctioned use of negative wills is to deprive parties
of standing to contest an estate plan. In New York for many years, a mort-
main statute barred testators from bequeathing more than half their estates
to charity if a parent or child survived them and contested the will, unless
the parent or child would derive no benefit from doing so under the terms of
the will or by intestacy. 55 Testators sought to circumvent this limitation by
imposing negative wills-effective in the state since 1967'56-on heirs. Giv-
en that they were added to complete estate plans, these negative wills served
no substantive purpose; but they did operate ostensibly to sustain otherwise
unsustainable estate plans by precluding parents or children from benefit-
ting in a caveat proceeding. In a line of opinions, courts in New York
upheld this technique,'57 despite misgivings that it served to undermine
legislative intent.'58
Although mortmain is now a thing of the past, 59 testators today might
attempt a similar maneuver to give effect to other objectionable estate
plans.160 A testator could create a trust for a (voidable) capricious purpose,
or for an otherwise valid noncharitable purpose that the testator wishes
capriciously to overfund,' 61 and then disinherit all heirs in the hope of
denying standing to anyone who might challenge the legality of the terms
of the trust. Whether this expedient would work remains to be tested; 62
155. N.Y. EST. POWERS &TRUSTS LAW § 5-3.3(a) (McKinney 1967) (repealed 1981).
156. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
157. E.g., In re Estate of Eckart, 348 N.E.2d 905, 906-08 (1976); In re Estate of Cairo,
312 N.Y.S.2d 925, 927-28 (App. Div. 1970), aff'd, 272 N.E.2d 574 (1971); Estate of Geyer,
N.Y. L.J., Oct. 21, 1975, at 12 (Sur. Ct.); In re Estate of Newkirk, 383 N.Y.S.2d 466, 467-68
(Sur. Ct. 1974); cf Newman v. Roman Catholic Bishop (Estate of Holtermann), 23 Cal. Rptr.
685, 692 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (disallowing the technique because negative wills were ineffec-
tive in the jurisdiction).
158. In re Estate of Rothko, 335 N.Y.S.2d 666, 670 (Sur. Ct. 1972) (observing that nega-
tive wills exploit a "loophole" in the statute); In re Estate of Norcross, 325 N.Y.S.2d 477, 481
(Sur. Ct. 1971) ("If a testator can defeat the statute by clever craftsmanship ... the statute can
be rendered futile."). But cf In re Eckart, 348 N.E.2d at 907-10 (pointing out that the legisla-
ture had already made it possible "to easily avoid" the statutory requirement by other
expedients).
159. Shirley Norwood Jones, The Demise of Mortmain in the United States, 12 Miss. C.
L. REV. 407 passim (1992).
160. Obviously, no such maneuver can help a wrongdoer give effect to a will procured
by undue influence or fraud, since an heir could challenge the effectiveness of the whole tes-
tamentary instrument that disinherits heirs; if the challenge succeeded, the negative will would
fall with the rest of the estate plan. In re Estate of Lippner, 429 N.Y.S.2d 839, 842-43 (Sur. Ct.
1980). The strategy to deny standing only has potential to forestall challenges based on sub-
stantive objections to an estate plan. See id. at 841-43.
161. On the capricious purpose doctrine, see Adam J. Hirsch, Bequests for Purposes: A
Unified Theory, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33, 69-84 (1999).
162. See In re Estate of Stoffel, 427 N.YS.2d 720, 721 (Sur. Ct. 1980) (concluding that
where a testator bequeathed the residue of his estate for the care of his mausoleum, a provision
disinheriting certain heirs deprived them of standing to challenge the reasonableness of the
size of the bequest), aff'd, 437 N.YS.2d 922 (App. Div. 1980). In that case, though, the pur-
pose trust statute giving effect to trusts for the care of graves made them charitable under state
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the answer depends on (1) whether by virtue of its right of escheat, the
state would then succeed to a right to challenge the trust, an issue on
which cases have offered conflicting authority, 63 and (2) if not, whether
the bar on capricious-purpose trusts is self-executing, empowering a court
to intervene sua sponte.' 64 The relevant statutes generally fail to speak to
either question, 65 opening the prospect of literal, hence costly, trial and
error.
Testators might also assay negative wills as a means of avoiding the
forced share for a surviving spouse. In some states, the forced "elective"
share is structured to provide benefits only out of the testamentary estate,
on the assumption that intestacy statutes offer a surviving spouse even
greater benefits. 66 Yet, if a testator can use a testamentary instrument
simply to impose a negative will on her spouse as heir, and the elective
share does not apply to the intestate portion of the estate, then an all-too-
simple expedient for circumventing mandatory inheritance rights would
become available. 67 As a practical matter, courts might be unwilling to
acknowledge such a loophole, whatever the statutes say. Nevertheless, the
possibility of success (however improbable) could occasion litigation, un-
less precluded by statutory text.
B. "Positive" Wills
In a sense, all of this is just the beginning. A negative will redefines a
testator's heirs in the event of partial intestacy by excluding one or more
of them. By the same token, a testator might positively redefine her heirs
by including others. Hence, a will might read: "My stepchild, A, is to be
treated as my child for all purposes under my estate." If the testator dies
law, N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.5 (McKinney 2012), so the state attorney general
had standing to oppose (and might also have brought) the challenge. See In re Stoffel, 427
N.Y.S.2d at 721.
163. Compare, e.g., Gombault v. Pub. Adm'r (In re Will of Bach), 4 Bradf. 226, 229
(N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1857), and State v. Lancaster, 105 S.W. 858, 862-64 (Tenn. 1907) (granting
standing to the state to bring a will contest, in the absence of known heirs), with, e.g., In re
Estate of Leslie, 156 N.Y.S. 346, 350 (Sur. Ct. 1915), aff'd, 161 N.Y.S. 790 (App. Div. 1916),
and Hopf v. State, 10 S.W. 589, 592 (Tex. 1888) (denying standing to the state to bring a will
contest, in lieu of heirs).
164. By analogy, courts can challenge trusts that violate the rule against perpetuities sua
sponte. E.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Topping, 41 N.Y.S.2d 736, 738 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Agan v.
U.S. Nat'l Bank, 363 P.2d 765, 770 (Or. 1961).
165. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-105, 2-907(a), (c)(6) (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1
U.L.A. 51, 254 (Supp. 2012); UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 404, 408-09 (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A.
484, 490, 493-94 (2006).
166. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-3-1(a), (d) (West 2012); MD. CODE ANN. EST. &
TRUSTS § 3-203 (LexisNexis 2011).
167. See In re Estate of Eckart, 368 N.Y.S.2d 28, 66-67 (App. Div. 1975) (Christ, J.,
concurring) (alluding to this possibility), rev'd, 384 N.Y.S.2d 429 (N.Y 1976).
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partially intestate, can a court regard the stepchild as equivalent to a natu-
ral child, sharing equally with natural children as heirs? 68
As a structural matter, such a positively redefined category of heirs
represents the mirror image of a negatively redefined category. Addition
and subtraction are alternative mathematical operations, and in each in-
stance we have the same evidence of testamentary intent, formalized in the
same way. If anything, in the case of a "positive" will, we can have even
greater confidence in our ability to reconstruct intent. Negative wills may
or may not reflect hostility, as we have seen,169 making intent to enforce
them under unanticipated conditions potentially unclear. But a "positive"
will unequivocally reflects benevolence. In the presence of such a clause,
we can readily infer a testator's preference for redefining heirs in the event
that a partial intestacy ensues.
Unsurprisingly, most of the few American cases raising this issue at
common law170 have dealt with "positive" wills in the same way they dealt
with negative wills-by holding them ineffective. In one such case, the
court even cited to the law of negative wills for support.171 Neither the
Uniform Probate Code nor the Restatement addresses the issue of "posi-
tive" wills, 172 but nothing in the language of either suggests that a court
can give effect to such provisions.
That is unfortunate. Once we validate wills that redefine heirs in a
negative way, public policy demands that we extend the principle to re-
definitions of all sorts. Such a rule would operate in harmony with another
provision of the Code, allowing a decedent to define whether posthumous-
ly conceived or implanted children qualify as heirs under the intestacy
statute.'73 Under the Code, a court can even consider extrinsic evidence to
determine a decedent's intent to establish the definition of heirs in this one
context; the definition need not appear within an executed writing. 174
168. No prior academic discussion has raised or addressed this issue.
169. See supra Part II.A.1.
170. Under late Roman civil law, however, for a will to take effect it had to designate an
heir of the testator, as distinct from beneficiaries of bequests. ALAN WATSON, ROMAN LAW &
COMPARATIVE LAW 78-81 (1991).
171. Dorsett v. Vought, 98 A. 248, 249 (N.J. 1916); see also Fid. Union Trust Co. v.
Laise, 12 A.2d 882, 890 (N.J. Ch. 1940) ("Of course, the fact that the testator referred to [a
beneficiary] as his son, although not legally adopted, does not bestow upon him any right to
inherit as heir ... ").
172. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101(b) & cmt. (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 43
(Supp. 2012); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.7
& cmts. (1999).
173. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f) (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012).
174. Id. One may observe another structurally similar rule of redefinition that arises
under judicial doctrine. Under the doctrine of equitable adoption, an unadopted child whom
the testator promised to adopt qualifies as an heir. See id. § 2-122, 8 pt. I U.L.A. 79 (Supp.
2012) (providing that the Uniform Probate Code does not preempt the doctrine); RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5 cmt. k (1999). In
theory, this doctrine does not operate to effectuate intent, although in practice it would appear
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Hence, a decedent can define posthumously conceived or implanted chil-
dren as heirs vel non in cases of complete intestacy, not just in cases of
partial intestacy. Were lawmakers to grant testators a broader power to
define heirs within the confines of a testamentary instrument, the authen-
ticity and meaning of such a clause would admit of even less doubt than
under the limited power envisioned by the drafters of the Code.
A British court was first to put forward the possibility of enforcing a
positive will in a broadly framed dictum published in 1936.175 A few
American courts have also seen the merits of such a doctrine, albeit too
obscurely to have elicited any scholarly notice before now. In a Georgia
case from half a century ago, a testator stated in his will that his stepson
"shall also have an equal share with all the heirs."'76 The state supreme
court ruled that because "it was the intent of the testator ... that [his step-
son] was to be treated as one of his heirs as if he were his own child," he
would be so treated when a partial intestacy occurred.' 77 The court offered
no analysis and cited no authority to defend this result; the opinion seems
in essence an intuitive ipse dixit. More recently, a lower court in New York
reached the same result for a partially intestate estate on the basis of lan-
guage in the will "provid[ing] that the testator's stepchildren are included
as beneficiaries of any bequest made to his ... children."'' The court
grounded its decision on New York's nonuniform statute permitting nega-
tive wills. 179 As in the Georgia case, the court in the instant case sensed
that giving effect to "positive" wills extends the doctrine of negative wills
in a sensible way. Still, the statute in New York contains no textual pro-
nouncement expressly supporting the court's construction. 80
to do so. For a discussion, see Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance Law, Legal Contraptions, and the
Problem of Doctrinal Change, 79 OR. L. REv. 527, 547-51 (2000).
175. Said the court,
[W]hen you have ascertained what interest has been undisposed of by the testator you
then look at the will to see whether as regards that interest he has given any directions,
and, if he has, those directions must be attended to. For instance .... a testator... might
insert a direction something to this effect in his will: "In the event of any of my property
being undisposed of by this my will and the provisions of [statutory rules of partial intes-
tacy] taking effect I direct that any such property shall be dealt with" in a particular way
Crabtree v. Thornber (In re Thornber), [1937] 1 Ch. 29 at 36-37. This dictum has never been
cited by an American court.
176. Eller v. Wages, 136 S.E.2d 730, 731 (Ga. 1964) (emphasis omitted).
177. Id. at 732.
178. In re Estate of Pessoni, No. 37-P/1996, 2008 WL 624449, at *1 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Mar.
10,2008).
179. Id. at *3.
180. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 1-2.19 (McKinney 2012) ("A will is an...
instrument ... whereby a person disposes of property or directs how it shall not be disposed of
.. ")
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But one other nonuniform statute contains just such a pronounce-
ment. 181 Under an obscure section of the Texas Probate Code, 182 a testator
can by will either "disinherit an heir"'83 or "direct the disposition of prop-
erty or an interest passing under the will or by intestacy."' By its plain
text, this statute permits both "positive" and negative wills. Although not
yet applied in any published cases, the Texas statute lays out a path toward
doctrinal reform in this area of inheritance law. 185
III. GIFrs AND INCOMPLETE WILLS
A different problem arises when a benefactor makes inter vivos gifts to
parties who also qualify as beneficiaries under a will or as intestate heirs. If
a benefactor leaves no will, the doctrine of advancement applies. Under this
doctrine, if the benefactor intended an inter vivos gift to comprise an ad-
vance on a child's inheritance, as shown by any evidence, the administrator
must factor in the gift when calculating the child's intestate share, thereby
equalizing the total gift and estate distributions that each child receives. 186 In
some states, under certain circumstances, the law presumes intent to treat a
gift as an advancement. 187 Under the Uniform Probate Code, by contrast, no
such presumption ever applies, and the benefactor must formalize an ad-
vancement in a contemporaneous writing.188
181. In two additional states, Arkansas and Ohio, a testator can appoint an heir in a judi-
cial proceeding. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-8-102 (2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.15
(LexisNexis 2011); see also Ricketts v. Ferrell, 671 S.W.2d 753, 753-54 (Ark. 1984). These
proceedings are functionally similar to antemortem probate proceedings, also made available
to testators in both of these states. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-202 (2012); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2107.081 (LexisNexis 2011). The statutes in these states make no provision for the
designation of an heir under a will, however, and the Ohio statute has been construed as not
allowing such a designation. See Moon v. Stewart, 101 N.E. 344, 347 (Ohio 1913) (dicta); In
re Will of Williamson, 5 Ohio N.P. 1, 3-4 (Prob. Ct. 1897), rev'd on other grounds, 6 Ohio
N.P. 79 (C.P. 1898).
182. Until now, the section has escaped notice or discussion by any commentator, aca-
demic or otherwise.
183. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 58(b)(1) (West 2012).
184, Id. § 58(b)(2) (emphasis added).
185. The model lawmakers overlooked the statute, as well as the doctrine it establishes:
neither Texas's nor Wisconsin's nonuniform statute appears on the tabulation of American
negative-will statutes found in the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS
& OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.7 statutory note (1999).
186. McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 83, § 2.6, at 74-76. For a modem commentary, see
Mary Louise Fellows, Concealing Legislative Reform in the Common-Law Tradition: The
Advancements Doctrine and the Uniform Probate Code, 37 VAND. L. REV. 671 passim (1984).
Advancement statutes have varied over the category of heirs that they cover, but all apply to
children. Harold I. Elbert, Advancements: 1, 51 MICH. L. REV. 665, 676-77 (1953).
187. McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 83, § 2.6, at 76; Harold I. Elbert, Advancements: II,
52 MICH. L. REV. 231, 248-52 (1953).
188. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2 -109(a) (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 58 (Supp. 2012)
(applying the doctrine to any heir).
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Alternatively, if a benefactor dies testate, the doctrine of ademption by
satisfaction applies. Under that doctrine, if the benefactor intended a gift
made to a beneficiary in part to satisfy a bequest left to that beneficiary un-
der the benefactor's will, the gift is again factored in by deducting it from
the bequest.189 Whereas the common law sometimes presumes intent to ap-
ply the doctrine, 9 ° the Code never does so; once more, it requires a writing
expressing intent.' 9' Lawmakers conceptualize the doctrines of advancement
and ademption by satisfaction as analogous and complementary. 192
Suppose, though, a testator executes an incomplete will and a partial in-
testacy ensues. Which of the two doctrines applies? Assume, for example,
that the testator's will provides a bequest of $50,000 each to three children,
A, B, and C, but the will includes no effective residuary clause. Under the
intestacy statute, A, B, and C comprise the testator's heirs. Evidence reveals
that the testator made an inter vivos gift of $80,000 to A, and that the testa-
tor intended this gift as a proxy for A's inheritance (and further that the
testator formalized this intent properly under state law). The doctrine of sat-
isfaction operates on individual bequests and therefore comes into play
whether or not they appear within a complete will. 193 Therefore, because the
gift to A exceeded A's bequest, the gift offsets A's bequest in its entirety, and
A receives nothing under the testator's will. But after offsetting $50,000 of
the $80,000 gift, does the court also take into account the remaining
$30,000 when ordering distributions under the intestacy statute? The answer
varies from state to state. In a minority of jurisdictions today, the doctrine of
advancement only operates in the event of a complete intestacy; in more
states-a group that has grown in number over the past half-century-the
doctrine extends to partial intestacy. 94
The Commissioners have shifted their stance on this issue in line with the
national trend. Under the original version of the Uniform Probate Code, the
doctrine of advancement applied only in instances of complete intestacy. 195 As
189. McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 83, § 2.6, at 78-79; Barney Barstow, Ademption by
Satisfaction, 6 Wis. L. RE v. 217 passim (1931).
190. 6 WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS
§§ 54.28-.30 (Jeffrey A. Schoenblum ed. Supp. 2012).
191. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-609(a) (amended 2010), 8 pt. I U.L.A. 183 (Supp. 2012).
192. See id. § 2-609 cmt. Even so, the Code contains a deliberate but unexplained incon-
sistency between the two doctrines. Compare id. § 2-109(c) & cmt., 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 58 (Supp.
2012) (disregarding an advancement to an heir who predeceases the decedent), with id. § 2-
609(c) & cmt., 8 pt. I U.L.A. 183 (Supp. 2012) (continuing to take into account a gift made to
a will beneficiary who predeceases the testator).
193. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.4
(1999); 6 BOWE & PARKER, supra note 190, § 54.3.
194. A review of all fifty state-advancement statutes by the author reveals that currently
(1) twelve apply expressly only in the event of a complete intestacy, (2) twenty also apply
expressly in the event of a partial intestacy, and (3) eighteen fail expressly to resolve the issue.
Sixty years ago, however, the reverse pattern prevailed. See Elbert, supra note 186, at 665;
Elbert, supra note 187, at 242-43.
195. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-110 & cmt. (pre-1990 version of article 2), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A.
288 (1998).
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revised in 1990, the Code's advancement section also covers partial intesta-
cy. 196 Predictably, the Restatement parrots the revised Code. 197 Yet, in the
accompanying comments neither the Commissioners nor the authors of the
Restatement offer a word of explanation to justify either the original rule or
the decision to change it. 198 Their silence suggests that this element of the
law of incomplete wills may have been incompletely thought through. 19
By applying the law of advancement to cases of partial intestacy, would
lawmakers better effectuate the testator's intent? Analysis suggests that it
depends. In our hypothetical example above, if the testator had made the
$80,000 gift to A sometime after executing the incomplete will, then pre-
sumably the testator will not have contemplated the gift at the time when
she formulated the estate plan. Under these circumstances, both the doctrine
of ademption by satisfaction and advancement should apply to pare down
both the bequest and (if necessary, as in our hypothetical) A's further share
under the intestacy statute. 0
The modem version of the Uniform Probate Code achieves this result.
Nevertheless, a glitch remains in the plain language of the Code. Suppose
that (as sometimes happens201) the will itself anticipates the possibility of
subsequent gifts and provides that they be deducted from a beneficiary's
testamentary share. Now we have direct evidence of intent to equalize the
shares and, a fortiori, the doctrine of advancement should apply in the event
of a partial intestacy. Under the text of the Code, the doctrine of ademption
by satisfaction will apply on the basis of the provision of the will, even if no
writing contemporaneous with a subsequent gift reiterates the intent to
equalize. 202 But if a partial intestacy follows, and the doctrine of satisfaction
196. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 109(a) & cmt. (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 58 (Supp.
2012).
197. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.6 cmt. i
(1999). This doctrine was not addressed in the second Restatement. Because the Reporter for the
third Restatement also served as Reporter for the Uniform Probate Code, the two have become
largely coordinated projects. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
198. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-110 cmt. (pre-1990 version of article 2), 8 pt. 1
U.L.A. 288-89 (1998); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-109 cmt. (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 58
(Supp. 2012); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.6
& cmts. (1999).
199. No prior academic discussions have subjected this aspect of advancement doctrine
to policy analysis.
200. Likewise, if the bequest to A under the will were specific rather than general, then
the doctrine of ademption by satisfaction might not apply under state law, rendering the doc-
trine of advancement potentially relevant. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-609 cmt. (amended
2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 183 (Supp. 2012); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.4 cmts. c & e (1999); 6 BowE & PARKER, supra note 190, §§ 54.23,
.33, .37.
201. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-609 cmt. (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 183 (Supp.
2012) ("Some wills expressly provide for lifetime advances by a hotchpot clause."); see also
Elbert, supra note 186, at 679-81 (discussing will provisions that charge advancements).
202. The doctrine of satisfaction applies "only if (i) the will provides for deduction of
the gift, [or] (ii) the testator [so] declared in a contemporaneous writing." UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 2-609(a) (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 183 (Supp. 2012).
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fails to cut back the inheritance sufficiently to achieve the intended equality,
as in our hypothetical, then the doctrine of advancement applies only if the
testator states in a second writing contemporaneous with the subsequent
gift that it was intended as an advancement. By its plain text, the Code
fails to permit formalization of an advancement by a prior writing, even
one executed as a legally valid will.203 A properly drafted statute adapting
the doctrine of advancement to cases of partial intestacy would offer testa-
tors that opportunity.
Now reverse the order of events. Suppose in our hypothetical that the
testator first made a gift intended (and properly formalized) as an advance-
ment to A and then subsequently executed the will allocating $50,000 each
to A, B, and C. Lawmakers have always assumed that when a will follows a
gift, the testator intends to take the gift into account when she fixes the size
of the bequests-or, to recall the terminology found in some of the cases,
the bequest "merges" the prior gift-advance.2°4 Accordingly, the doctrine of
satisfaction fails to apply; it only pertains to gifts that succeed wills. 20 5
The same principle should inform the doctrine of advancement under in-
complete wills: the testator will have considered a prior gift-advance when
setting the amount of the bequests under the will, and the doctrine of ad-
vancement should no longer apply. Although in this scenario a testator could
conceivably anticipate that the law of advancement will continue to cover
the intestate portion of the estate and rely on adjustments to intestate shares
when allocating the testate portion of the estate, the likelihood of this sort of
premeditation seems vanishingly small. Partial intestacy appears almost in-
variably to arise through inadvertence, not design.206 Nevertheless, under the
203. Id. § 2-109(a), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 58 (Supp. 2012) ("If an individual dies intestate as to
all or a portion of his [or her] estate ... [a gift to] an heir is treated as an advancement ...
only if (i) the decedent declared in a contemporaneous writing ... that the gift is an advance-
ment, or (ii) the decedent's contemporaneous writing ... otherwise indicates that the gift is to
be taken into account in computing the division ... of the decedent's intestate estate." (first
alteration in original)).
204. E.g., In re Estate of Sechler, 190 A.2d 302, 303 (Pa. 1963).
205. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.4
cmt. a (1999); 6 BowE & PARKER, supra note 190, §§ 54.22, 55.2; McGOVERN ET AL., supra
note 83, § 2.6, at 78 (1999). The Uniform Probate Code could be clearer on this point: no-
where does its section covering ademption by satisfaction expressly limit the doctrine to gifts
that succeed wills. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-609(a) (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 183
(Supp. 2012). Nevertheless, for the doctrine to apply under the Code, the testator must "de-
clare[] in a contemporaneous writing that the gift is in satisfaction of the devise." Id. This
language arguably implies that a will setting out the devise must already exist.
206. A rare judicial analysis is pertinent:
[I]t is apparent from the provisions of the will, that [the testator] designed and manifestly
supposed that he had made a disposition of his whole estate.... [Iln view of all his pre-
vious advancements, he [subsequently] made such a distribution of his property, by his
will, as he deemed just and proper. In such a case, therefore, although the testator had,
unexpectedly and beyond his own anticipation, died intestate, as to the residuum of his
estate, the statutory provision as to advancements could have no just application.
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Uniform Probate Code, the doctrine of advancement applies in cases of par-
tial intestacy, irrespective of whether the gift followed or preceded execution
of the will. 207
A further complication, though, muddies the waters of our conjectures.
Suppose a testator makes a gift-advance to a child and later executes a will
that fails to provide bequests to any of the children. In this situation, the
testator has not overtly calculated how much the donee-child should receive
relative to others. The testator's omission of bequests to other children might
signify her intent to forgive the advancement under the will; had she wished
to compensate for the advancement, the testator could have made equalizing
bequests to the other children. But at the same time, the testator could be
relying on a surrogate to do so. Suppose, for example, the testator executes a
will making small bequests to other family members and then leaves the
residue, comprised of the bulk of the estate, to her spouse. The testator may
assume that the spouse will take gift-advances into account when calculat-
ing how, in turn, to divide their combined estates among their children. But
if the spouse predeceases the testator, causing the residuary bequest to lapse
and a partial intestacy to ensue, then the spouse can no longer play this role;
under these circumstances, the testator might wish the doctrine of advance-
ment to apply after all. The case, in short, is unclear, making intent difficult
to anticipate. 208
All of this suggests that any per se rule assimilating gifts into incomplete
estate plans is insufficiently refined. Application of the doctrine of ad-
vancement to partial intestacy should turn on whether the advancement
occurred before or after the will was executed; and if the advancement oc-
curred before the testator executed a will that names no children as
beneficiaries, then ideally extrinsic evidence should be admissible to clarify
intent. The laws of Great Britain once contained a flexible rule of this sort.
Under the Administration of Estates Act of 1925, the doctrine of advance-
ment applied to the shares of children in the event of partial intestacy but
"subject to any contrary intention expressed or appearing from the
circumstances of the case."2 9 This provision disappeared after 1995, when
Parliament ended the duty of children to account for advancements in cases
of partial intestacy.2 10 The Uniform Probate Code continues that duty but
Needles v. Needles, 7 Ohio St. 432, 435-36 (1857); see also supra note 9 and accompanying
text; infra note 210.
207. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
208. A further exceptional case arises where a will does bequeath to some children and
entirely omits the child who received a prior gift intended as an advancement. Either the will
or extrinsic evidence might show that the testator reduced the child's bequest to nothing in
order to take account of the gift-advance, still without succeeding in fully equalizing the chil-
dren's respective shares. See In re Estate of Hayne, 133 P. 277, 278-79 (Cal. 1913) (applying
the doctrine of advancement to a partially intestate estate on this basis).
209. Administration of Estates Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 23, § 47(l)(iii) (Eng. & Wales)
(repealed 1995).
210. Law Reform (Succession) Act, 1995, c. 41, §§ l(2)(a), 1(3) (Eng. & Wales). This
change conformed with the recommendation of the Law Commission, which deemed the
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fails to draw any distinctions or afford any discretion. By making the doc-
trine of advancement applicable to partial intestacy in all cases, the Code is
likely to carry out testators' intent only in some cases.
IV. DISTRIBUTIVE RULES OF PARTIAL INTESTACY
The larger question that remains is how to treat the intestate portion of
an incomplete estate plan when a testator has indicated nothing in the text of
the will about who she would want to include or exclude as an heir. The
usual principle that applies in this situation is to treat the two legal domains
as perfectly distinct. The will holds sway within its four walls; the law of
intestacy governs beyond. The Uniform Probate Code codifies this dichoto-
my, stating that "[a]ny part of a decedent's estate not effectively disposed of
by will passes by intestate succession," 21I and the Restatement concurs.2 12
A few American jurisdictions deviate from this pattern, however. In
those states, the rules of complete and partial intestacy differ to some extent.
A. Existing Deviations
One alternative framework, currently found in only a single American
state, also existed for a time within British law. Under many state intestacy
statutes (along with Great Britain's), a surviving spouse receives a share of
the estate that sometimes varies with its net value. 213 Under the Uniform
Probate Code, for example, if an intestate decedent leaves surviving de-
scendants who are not also descendants of the surviving spouse, the spouse
receives the first $150,000 (sometimes called the "preferential share") out
of the net probate estate, plus one-half of the balance (the "fractional
share"). 2 14 Hence, the spouse's total proportional inheritance as an heir rises
original rule of advancement as applied to partial intestacy "complex and expensive to admin-
ister." THE LAW COMM'N, FAMILY LAW DISTRIBUTION ON INTESTACY 22 (1989). The Law
Commission also observed that the rule could "defeat the very object of the deceased in mak-
ing the partial disposition in the will," id. 55, while "the burden of proving a contrary
intention lies with the issue concerned." Id. 1[ 47. Here, the Law Commission appeared to
recognize that when a testator executes a will following an advancement, she probably takes
the advancement into consideration when setting distributions under the will.
211. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101(a) (amended 2010), 8 pt. I U.L.A. 43 (Supp. 2012).
212. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.1 &
cmts. a & e (1999).
213. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.2
statutory notes 2, 3(a) (2009). For a discussion of the British rule and its history, see C.H.
SHERRIN & R.C. BONEHILL, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTESTATE SUCCESSION 216-22 (3d
ed. 2004).
214. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102(4) & cmt. (amended 2010), 8 pt. I U.L.A. 45 (Supp.
2012). Within the Code, the size of the preferential share varies under different sets of as-
sumptions and the dollar amount is indexed for inflation. Id. §§ 1-109, 2-102(1)-(4), 8 pt. I
U.L.A. 18,45 (Supp. 2012).
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for smaller estates-a result justified by empirical evidence of individuals'
wishes.215
Great Britain's intestacy statute employs a similar formula.2 16 Prior to
1996, though, the British statute included a further wrinkle: in the event of
a partial intestacy, the surviving spouse's preferential share was dimin-
ished by any sums the spouse received under the will.2 17 In effect, then,
Great Britain treated bequests to the spouse like advancements, reducing
the spouse's intestate share, but only with respect to the spouse's preferen-
tial share, not her fractional share of the estate .21  The same rule exists
today under the intestacy statute of Pennsylvania.219 Michigan formerly
applied this rule, but abolished it in 2000.220
Two other states go further still. Under the intestacy statute of Kentucky,
bequests to a child or grandchild under wills are treated as advancements for
purposes of calculating the full extent of the child or grandchild's share as
heir in the event of a partial intestacy; she must account for the amount re-
ceived by will before she can take by partial intestacy.21 The same rule
applies in Tennessee to all heirs, without limitation to descendants. 2 2 Still
215. Id. § 2-102 cmt.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DON-
ATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.2 reporter's notes 1-2 (1999).
216. SHERRIN & BONEHILL, supra note 213, at 216-22.
217. Administration of Estates Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 23, § 49(1)(aa) (Eng. & Wales)
(as amended 1952) (repealed 1995) (making an exception for specific bequests of tangible
personal property). For a discussion of this provision, see SHERRIN & BONEHILL, supra note
213, at 304-07.
218. Since 1996, a surviving spouse in England or Wales receives the same share by
partial intestacy that she would receive in the event of a complete intestacy. Administration of
Estates Act § 49 (as amended by Law Reform (Succession) Act, 1995, c. 41, § l(2)(b)). The
Law Commission had again criticized the former rule as "complex and expensive to adminis-
ter," noting that "many administrators of estates are lay persons who have little previous
knowledge and experience of the intestacy rules." THE LAW COMM'N, supra note 210, at 22.
219. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2102(5) (West 2005) (making no exception for bequests
of personalty).
220. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.105(b) (West 2002) (repealed 2000) (applicable in
one of the two situations where a preferential share arose, and making no exception for be-
quests of personalty). Repeal appears to have occurred without debate, as part of the omnibus
enactment of the substantive article of the Uniform Probate Code in Michigan. See id.
§ 700.2102.
221. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.140 (LexisNexis 2010) (applying the doctrine of ad-
vancement to "[a]ny real or personal property or money, given or devised' (emphasis added)).
The statutory rule was given effect in Bowles v. Winchester, 76 Ky. 1, 6-13 (1877), and Wal-
ters v. Neafus, 125 S.W. 167, 170 (Ky. 1910).
222. TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-5-102 (2007) (covering "[a]ll advancements, whether by
settlement or otherwise, in the lifetime of deceased, or by testamentary provision...."). The rule
was applied in Vance v. Huling, 10 Tenn. 135, 136-37 (1826); Sturdevant v. Goodrich, I Tenn.
95, 96-98 (1832); and Gold v. Vaughan, 36 Tenn. 245, 247-49 (1856). In North Carolina, the
state supreme court initially construed a state statute as instituting the same rule. Norwood v.
Branch, 4 N.C. (Taylor) 400, 400-01 (1816). Subsequently, though, the same court reconsid-
ered and rejected such a construction. See Wilson v. Hightower, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 76, 77-78
(1824); Ford v. Whedbee, 21 N.C. (21 Dev. & Bat. Eq.) 16, 21 (1834); Johnston v. Johnston,
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current, both statutory rules are of ancient vintage: Kentucky's Act first
appeared on the statute book in 1852; Tennessee's in 1784.223 Britain also
formerly had such a rule, applicable to all descendants of the testator, but
again abolished the rule in 1995.224
Although now unique to the state, Pennsylvania's approach to the pref-
erential share fits the rationale for including such a share within the
scheme of intestacy. Assuming a decedent typically would want her surviv-
ing spouse to receive a minimum amount from the estate, whatever its size,
a decedent meets that commitment when she furnishes the spouse with tes-
tate assets. Viewed another way, the preferential share is supposed to
provide a surviving spouse a larger proportion of smaller estates-but if an
estate is composed of both testate and intestate assets, then the intestate por-
tion bears no consistent relationship to the size of the total estate. Treating
bequests to the spouse as advancements of the preferential share adjusts for
this distortion.2 25 Nevertheless, the Commissioners have never incorporated
this rule into any of the preferential shares created under the Uniform Pro-
bate Code.2 2
6
At the same time, the rule found in Kentucky and Tennessee, treating
bequests as advancements in cases of partial intestacy, appears at odds with
the likely intent of a testator. By executing a will varying the shares of chil-
dren (or other heirs), the testator expresses a wish to benefit them unevenly.
To compensate for uneven bequests when distributing property not covered
by the estate plan contradicts that wish.2 7 The preamble of Tennessee's first
statute imposing the rule in 1784 indicates that it sought not to effectuate
intent, but rather "to promote that equality of property which is the spirit
and principle of a genuine republic." '228 Lawmakers have long since aban-
doned the idea of bending inheritance to political ends. Plainly, the statutes
at issue are obsolete, and their survival today as legal archaisms reminds the
39 N.C. (4 Ired. Eq.) 9, 11-14 (1845); see also Walker v. Williamson, 25 Ga. 549, 556-57
(1858) (rejecting this statutory construction in Georgia).
223. For the respective statutory histories, see Bowles, 76 Ky. at 10-12, and Pearce v.
Gleaves, 18 Tenn. 359, 360-61 (1837) (decided under prior statutory law).
224. Administration of Estates Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 23, § 49(l)(a) (Eng. & Wales)
(repealed 1995). For a discussion of this provision, widely criticized for its lack of clarity, see
SHERRIN & BONEHILL, supra note 213, at 310-17.
225. Compare the British Law Commission's concern that such a rule is administratively
complex. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
226. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102 (amended 2010), 8 pt. I U.L.A. 45 (Supp. 2012).
227. Walker, 25 Ga. at 557 ("We should disappoint [the testator's] purpose, and indeed,
make a will for him, if we were to hold that the legatees should account for what they received
under the will, before they could share in the undisposed part of the estate.").
228. Sturdevant v. Goodrich, 11 Tenn. (3 Yer.) 95, 96 (1832) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Likewise in Kentucky, the rule serves "the purpose of effecting an equitable distribu-
tion. The legislative will is consulted, and not the intention of the testator or intestate...."
Bowles, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) at 12; see also Norwood v. Branch, 4 N.C. (Taylor) 400, 400 (1816).
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student just how commonly and persistently lawmakers have succumbed to
legislative neglect in the inheritance field. 29
B. Proposed Deviations
From the standpoint of intent-effectuation, indeed, we must consider the
merits of the opposite approach. Rather than compensate for individualized
bequests, courts could extrapolate from them, using an incomplete will as a
blueprint for the whole estate. In the bargain, partial intestacy would disap-
pear as a concept, and any instructions in the will concerning the exclusion
or redefinition of heirs would become superfluous.
Although nowhere codified as such, this idea is not alien to American
judicial thinking. In crafting a related doctrine, lawmakers have recognized
that the particularized will can effectuate intent more accurately than the
generalized intestacy statute, although lawmakers have disagreed about the
scope of that principle.
1. Lapse
Consider the doctrine of lapse. If a beneficiary under a will predeceases
the testator, the estate plan mandated by the will becomes impossible to car-
ry out in literal terms: the beneficiary is no longer available to receive
property. But the inability of the executor to honor a "lapsed" bequest does
not ordinarily cause a partial intestacy. If the testator included a residuary
clause in the will, the residuary beneficiary receives all bequests that lapse,
unless the will provides otherwise.23° Given that the testator intended unal-
located property to flow to the residuary beneficiary, courts assume that the
testator would also want allocated property under an impossible bequest to
go to that beneficiary.23' In other words, the will, rather than the intestacy
statute, guides the disposition of the impossible bequest. Only if a will fails
to include a residuary clause do the testator's heirs succeed to a lapsed be-
quest.
Suppose the residue itself is divided among several beneficiaries and one
of them predeceases the testator. Who receives the predeceasing residuary
beneficiary's share-the surviving residuary beneficiaries or the testator's
heirs? Under the common law's no-residue-upon-a-residue rule, a partial
intestacy occurs and the heirs take, unless the will provides otherwise. 232
Received from Great Britain, this rule once predominated among the Ameri-
229. For some additional examples, see Adam J. Hirsch, Cognitive Jurisprudence, 76 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1344 n.58 (2003).
230. 6 BOWE & PARKER, supra note 190, § 50.16. Under statutory law, a lapsed bequest
may also go to descendants of the predeceasing beneficiary under some circumstances. RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 1.2,5.5 (1999).
231. See, e.g., In re Batchelder, 18 N.E. 225, 226 (Mass. 1888) ("The testator knows that
his specific intentions may fail, and it is partly on that account that he follows up his more
particular provisions with a general drag-net.").
232. E.g., Clark v. Case, 42 So. 2d 109, 111 (Miss. 1949).
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can states, 23 3 but it has waned in recent decades; 234 one by one, a large ma-
jority of states have switched (usually by statute, but in a few instances by
judicial decision) to an alternative doctrine, dubbed the remain-in-the-
residue rule.235 This rule gives any lapsed residuary portions to the surviving
residuary beneficiaries. 23 6 Both the Uniform Probate Code and the Restate-
ment endorse the shift237 (albeit with imperfect clarity238). The modem
construction, again looking to the will to complete the estate plan, functions
to avoid a partial intestacy.
Critics of the old no-residue-upon-a-residue rule urge that the will offers
a better indication of the testator's wishes than the intestacy statute in this
situation. As one court reasoned, "Ordinarily a testator will include his most
favored legatees in the residual bequest intending that they shall take the
bulk of his estate to the exclusion of any unnamed heirs."23 9 Considered in
this light, "slightly enlarging the shares of named residuary beneficiaries
would more likely match the testatrix's intent than would distributing the
lapsed shares to persons whom she potentially did not even include in her
will. '2  Defenders of the common law rule-and a few remain-retort that
233. See id. ("This general rule of construction ... is followed by most jurisdictions
234. Only eight states today continue to enforce the no-residue-upon-a-residue rule. See
In re Estate of McFarland, 167 S.W.3d 299, 304 n.6 (Tenn. 2005).
235. Id. at 307 (Drowota, C.J., dissenting).
236. For the evolving law, see 6 BOWLES & PARKER, supra note 190, § 50.18; W.W. Allen,
Annotation, Devolution of Lapsed Portion of Residuary Estate, 36 A.L.R.2d 1117 passim (1954);
A.M.S., Annotation, Devolution of Lapsed Portion of Residuary Clause, 139 A.L.R. 868 passim
(1942); and A.G.S., Annotation, Devolution of Lapsed Portion Under Residuary Clause, 28
A.L.R. 1237 passim (1924). British law continues to follow the no-residue-upon-a-residue rule.
ROGER KERRIDGE ASSISTED BY A.H.R. BRIERLEY, PARRY AND KERRIDGE: THE LAW OF SUCCES-
SION § 14-75 (12th ed. 2009).
237. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-604(b) (amended 2010), 8 pt. I U.L.A. 178 (Supp. 2012);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.5 cmt. o (1999).
238. According to the Uniform Probate Code, the remain-in-the-residue rule applies when
a bequest of a share of the residue "fails for any reason." UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-604(b)
(amended 2010), 8 pt. I U.L.A. 178 (Supp. 2012). The accompanying comment neglects to clari-
fy the meaning of this phrase, see id. cmt., and courts have divided over whether it covers
bequests of shares of the residue that the testator subsequently revoked by codicil, in contradis-
tinction to lapsed bequests, compare Jones v. Bransford, 606 S.W.2d 118, 118-19 (Ark. Ct. App.
1980) (distinguishing revocation from failure), with In re Estate of Doughtie, 2006 WL 933372,
at *3-4 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 27, 2006) (associating revocation with failure). The Restatement,
however, takes the view that revocation qualifies as a form of failure. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 4.3 illus. 8, 5.5 cmt. o (1999).
239. In re Frolich Estate, 295 A.2d 448, 452 (N.H. 1972).
240. In re Estate of McFarland, 167 S.W.3d 299, 307 (Tenn. 2005) (Drowota, C.J., dis-
senting); see also, e.g., Corbett v. Skaggs, 207 P. 819, 822 (Kan. 1922) ("The reasons for
allowing lapsed specific legacies to fall into the residue apply with equal force in favor of
allowing all the residue to go to the surviving residuary legatees ... instead of turning over a
part of it to persons for whom other provision had been made, or who had not been referred to
in the will at all."); Commerce Nat'l Bank of Toledo v. Browning, 107 N.E.2d 120, 125 (Ohio
1952) (similar observation). For similar academic commentary, see ATKINSON, supra note
142, at 785, and Allen, supra note 236, at 1118.
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the old rule causes the testator's property to "pass to the most natural objects
of her bounty-her heirs," whereas the remain-in-the-residue rule would
"completely redraft the terms of the will," giving the surviving residuary
beneficiaries "enlarge[d] ... percentages" that the testator never intended to
create. 24
One court has described this debate as a clash between "two competing
schools of thought as to what a testator would most probably desire to hap-
pen when a residuary gift lapses. 242 On reflection, though, it seems that the
two theories are potentially reconcilable; the strength of the alternative ar-
guments hinges incrementally on the circumstances. In the ordinary run of
situations, the bulk of an estate flows through the residue. Consequently,
when a testator allocates a large fraction of the residue to a beneficiary, the
testator does indeed signal her closeness to that beneficiary. When, however,
a testator allocates only a small fraction of the residue to a beneficiary, the
bequest fails to carry the same connotations; given a choice, the testator
might well prefer to enrich her heirs, rather than heap further rewards on a
beneficiary whom the testator has not singled out as a "most favored lega-
tee[] .-243
To posit stark examples, suppose a testator divides the residue between
two beneficiaries, allocating 99 percent of the residue to A and the remain-
ing 1 percent to B. B predeceases the testator, but A survives. Because A
comprises the primary beneficiary, it stands to reason that the testator would
want A to absorb B's lapsed fraction of the residue, which is thereby only
"slightly enlarge[ed]." 24 But if we turn the tables and assume that A prede-
ceases the testator while B survives, the like assumption becomes
problematic. B was a relatively minor beneficiary to begin with, and to aug-
ment B's share so substantially as a result of A's death distorts the estate
plan and thereby could easily do violence to the testator's intent.245
241. In re McFarland, 167 S.W.3d at 305; see also, e.g., Ensley v. Valley Nat'l Bank of
Ariz. (In re Estate of Jackson), 471 P.2d 278, 280 (Ariz. 1970) ("[T]o allow the lapsed residue
to pass to the surviving residuary legatees would defeat the intent of the testator who intended
the residuary beneficiaries to receive only the portion specified in the will and no more."); In
re Estate of Levy, 415 P.2d 1006, 1008 (Olda. 1966) (similar observation). For an early state-
ment of the argument, see Cunningham's Devisees v. Cunningham's Heirs, 57 Ky. 19, 23
(1857) (asserting that the no-residue-upon-a-residue rule is preferable "because it would be
inconsistent with the evident intention of the testator to give [a surviving residuary benefi-
ciary] a larger proportion of [the residue] than [the testator] had declared he should be entitled
to"). For an academic endorsement, see 2 THOMAS JARMAN, A TREATISE ON WILLS 1030
(Raymond Jennings & John C. Harper eds., 8th ed. 1951) (offering British commentary).
242. In re McFarland, 167 S.W.3d at 305.
243. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 240 and accompanying text. The same analysis applies, incidentally,
where a bequest lapses above a residuary bequest which remains effective. At least in the
typical case, the residuary bequest will dwarf the lapsed bequest, and this favoritism justifies
the traditional assumption that lapsed bequests flow into the residue, rather than to the heirs
via a partial intestacy.
245. In this circumstance, if a bequest lapses above the residue, directing the lapsed
bequest to a minor residuary beneficiary also becomes more problematic; here, though, the
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The structural insight to glean here is that incompleteness is a matter of
degree, and the extent of incompleteness can affect a testator's preferences
regarding the missing component of the estate plan. When only a small frac-
tion of the residue is left undisposed of, reallocating it by reference to an
estate plan naming a primary beneficiary makes sense; but when much of
the residue is undisposed of, rendering the residuary aspect of the estate
plan very incomplete, reliance on a small part of the plan to dispose of the
better part becomes a doubtful exercise.
Given factual variation, the ideal approach may be to give courts a
choice between implementing either the no-residue-upon-a-residue rule or
the remain-in-the-residue rule in any given case, depending on which seems
more likely to effectuate intent in light of the scale of the lapse that oc-
curred, coupled with extrinsic evidence.246 In the absence of evidence one
way or the other, a default rule in favor of the modem rule could continue to
apply.
247
Precedents (of a sort) do exist for this approach. In a large majority of ju-
risdictions, historically, courts lacked formal discretion over the disposition of
a lapsed bequest, and they have resisted the suggestion that the relative size of
the predeceasing and surviving residuary interests should affect the applica-
tion of the rules of lapse. 248 Yet, as we know, law in action sometimes diverges
amount of the bequest typically is less, and hence less distortive of the estate plan set out with-
in the will, than a lapsed residuary bequest.
246. For a case in which extrinsic evidence clarified a preference for partial intestacy
where a bequest of a share of the residue was revoked, see Bott v. Wright (Estate of Uhl), 81
Cal. Rptr. 436, 438-40 (Ct. App. 1969).
247. In principle, lawmakers need not limit this option to a lapse within the residue; they
could also grant courts leave to make this choice in instances where a lapse occurs above the
residue. One court observed:
[A]s an original question, there might ... [be] some doubt about the fair construction of
a general residuary clause. It might seem as likely ... that the words, "rest" or "residue,"
mean "property of which I have not attempted to make disposition hereby" as that they
mean "property of which I have not made a valid disposition hereby."
Kellogg v. Campbell, 209 N.E.2d 645, 646-47 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1965) (emphasis in original)
(quoting 6 BOWLES & PARKER, supra note 190, § 50.16, at 107) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Under the old English common law, abolished by act of Parliament in 1837, lapsed
devises of land bypassed the residue and went to the heirs. Thomas Amory Lee, The Devolu-
tion of Void and Lapsed Devises, 25 COLuM. L. REv. 447, 447-49 (1925). By statute,
Kentucky maintained this rule of lapse for all sorts of bequests until 1974. See 2 JAMES R.
MERRITT, KENTUCKY PRACTICE SERIES PROBATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1731 (Norvie
L. Lay ed., 2d. ed. Supp. 2012); see also, Cundiff v. Schmitt, 243 S.W.2d 667, 668-69 (Ky.
1951) (applying the old rule). Yet lapse above the residue is such a common phenomenon that
a flexible rule applicable to nonresiduary lapse would carry in its train significant administra-
tive burdens for courts. This fact, coupled with the likelihood that the modem rule allotting
lapsed bequests to the residue reflects intent in most cases, see supra notes 231, 244-245,
suggests that the game is probably not worth the candle.
248. See Zille v. Am. Legion (In re Estate of Zilles), 200 P3d 1024, 1030 n.7 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2008) ("We reject the notion urged by the [h]eirs at oral argument that [the lapsed be-
quest of] 90% [of the residue] is so much greater than [the two survivors' respective shares of]
5% that we should dispense with the remaining residuary beneficiaries as functionally de
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from law in books. It was a notorious fact-acknowledged by Judge Cardozo
in a candid moment-that a court operating under the old no-residue-upon-a-
residue rule could in practice keep lapsed residuary bequests within the
residue by declaring them part of an implicit class gift whenever the judge
was disposed to do so.49 No complementary legal fiction stands available un-
der the remain-in-the-residue rule,"0 which has spread to most states.251 This
rigidity of application arguably represents a functional drawback of the mod-
em rule.
Under recognized law, precursors of the approach proposed here are fewer
but not wholly lacking: in two jurisdictions today, courts have leave to exer-
cise discretion in the event of a lapse in the residue. A line of decisions in
Wisconsin granted courts authority to choose between the alternative out-
comes on the basis of both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence. 252 The state has
minimis") (decided under the remain-in-the-residue rule); Skrymsher v. Northcote, (1818) 36
Eng. Rep. 507 (Ch.) 509; 1 Swans. 566, 571 ("In the instance of a residue given in moieties, to
hold that one moiety lapsing should accrue to the other, would be to hold that a gift of a moie-
ty of the residue shall eventually carry the whole. Whatever argument applies to the entirety of
the moiety applies to every part of it; the distinction is mere sub-division.") (decided under the
no-residue-upon-a-residue rule).
249. The no-residue-upon-a-residue rule is "reluctantly enforced by courts when tokens
are not at hand to suggest an opposite intention." Oliver v. Wells, 173 N.E. 676, 678 (N.Y.
1930) (Cardozo, J.); see also In re Estate of Burke, 222 A.2d 273, 279 (N.J. 1966) ("[Ilt was
not unusual to find ... avoidance of the rule on rather tenuous grounds where the court sought
to effectuate its view of the testator's desire in the contingency?'); Nielsen v. Nielsen (In re
Nielsen's Will), 41 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Wis. 1950) (construing the will to avoid the no-residue-
upon-a-residue rule). For academic observations, see 6 BOWLES & PARKER, supra note 190,
§ 50.18, at 114, and The 1956-57 Legislature: Problems Left Uncorrected, 26 FORDHAM L.
REv. 372, 379 (1957). One court has characterized judicial evasion of the old rule as a doctri-
nal subtlety: "Several of the courts which follow the [no-residue-upon-a-residue] rule have
developed an exception that the rule will readily yield to contrary indications gathered from
the will as read in light of the attending circumstances." Ensley v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz.
(In re Estate of Jackson), 471 P.2d 278, 280 (Ariz. 1970). One circumstance sometimes cited
to override the no-residue-upon-a-residue rule has been the presence of a negative will, indi-
cating the testator's preference to avoid a partial intestacy-thereby giving effect to a negative
will indirectly, through the medium of construction. See, e.g., Fulkerson v. Fitch (In re Estate
of Roulston), 142 So. 2d 107, 110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Strauss v. Strauss, 2 N.E.2d 699,
703 (I11. 1936); Horseman v. Horseman, 217 S.W.2d 645, 647-48 (Ky. 1949); Cavers v. St.
Louis Union Trust Co., 531 S.W.2d 526, 533-35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); In re Estate of Dam-
mann, 191 N.E.2d 452, 454 (N.Y. 1963). For early examples, see Willis v. Watson, 5 I11. (4
Scam.) 64, 68-69 (1842), and Atkins v. Kron, 37 N.C. (2 Ired. Eq.) 58, 62 (1841) (per curiam).
But see Strohm v. McMullen, 89 N.E.2d 383, 387 (Ill. 1949) (expressly rejecting this principle
of construction), overruled in part on other grounds by Schroeder v. Ben, 138 N.E.2d 496 (I11.
1956).
250. See, e.g., Olsen v. Erickson (In re Estate of Ulrikson), 290 N.W.2d 757, 758-60
(Minn. 1980) (where the facts suggest the testator probably would have preferred to apply the
old rule). For a criticism of the case on related grounds, see Roberts, supra note 90, at 372-73.
251. See supra notes 233-237 and accompanying text.
252. Nielsen v. Nielsen (In re Nielsen's Will), 41 N.W.2d 369, 371-72 (Wis. 1950);
Stone v. Stone (In re Waterbury's Will), 158 NW. 340, 342 (Wis. 1916).
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since codified this rule.253 And under the unique "probable intent" doctrine
that prevails in New Jersey, a court can deviate from the terms of a will and
from the applicable rules of construction whenever necessary to effectuate
intent.25 4 In at least one instance, a New Jersey court has invoked the prob-
able intent doctrine to redistribute a lapsed residuary bequest to the
testator's heirs, 255 despite a state statute ordaining the remain-in-the-
residue rule.
256
2. No Residuary
The problem of lapse in the residue aligns with the problem of incom-
pleteness caused by the total failure or absence of a residuary bequest. Here,
one discovers a brace of dueling presumptions that have long competed
within the case law of will construction. Courts have created a presumption
against intestacy, for "the mere fact that the testatrix made a will is evidence
of an intent not to die intestate."257 But courts simultaneously posit a pre-
sumption against disinheritance of heirs, the persons thought to comprise
"the natural objects of [the testator's] bounty."258 Courts arguing for the re-
main-in-the-residue rule cite to the first presumption for support, while
defenders of the no-residue-upon-a-residue rule point to the second.2 9
With regard to a will excluding an heir, these two presumptions are
sometimes said to "neutralize each other."260 But as a policy matter, they
253. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 854.07(2), (4) (West 2012) (applying the no-residue-upon-a-
residue rule unless the testator intended otherwise, and providing that "[e]xtrinsic evidence
may be used to construe the intent").
254. Beginning as a judicial rule, the probable intent doctrine is now codified in the New
Jersey probate statutes. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-33.1(a) (West 2012). For a fuller discus-
sion of the doctrine, see Richard David Hofstetter, Survey of Trusts and Estates-Doctrine of
Probable Intent, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 574 passim (1978).
255. Engle v. Siegel, 377 A.2d 892, 895-97 (N.J. 1977).
256. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-36(b) (West 2012).
257. Zint v. Crofton, 563 S.W.2d 287, 290 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); see also supra note 9.
258. Rowe v. Rowe, 720 A.2d 1225, 1227 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) (quoting Curtis v.
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 13 A.2d 546 (Md. 1940)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also, e.g., Bolin v. Walters (In re Estate of Walters), 519 N.E.2d 1270, 1274 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1988) (suggesting that the presumption follows from "the natural impulses of people"
to benefit heirs). Variants of the two presumptions stand side by side in the Restatement. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.3(c)(2)-(3)
(2003).
259. Compare Ensley v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz. (In re Estate of Jackson), 471 P.2d
278, 281 (Ariz. 1970), and In re Estate of McFarland, 167 S.W.3d 299, 307 (Tenn. 2005)
(Drowota, C.J., dissenting) (citing the presumption against intestacy to justify the remain-in-
the-residue rule), with id. at 305 (citing the presumption against disinheritance of heirs to
justify the no-residue-upon-a-residue rule). See also English v. Cooper, 55 N.E. 687, 688 (I1.
1899) (citing the presumption against intestacy to justify the rule that lapsed bequests above
the residue flow into the residue); Wright v. Wright, 122 N.E. 213, 216-17 (N.Y. 1919)
(same).
260. In re Estate of Fitzgerald, 288 N.Y.S.2d 71,75 (App. Div. 1968) (per curiam) (quot-
ing Adams v. Massey, 76 N.E. 916, 919 (N.Y. 1906)) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff'd,
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again appear to evince a kind of variable tension that does not quite qualify
as an antinomy. On the one hand, we would expect a testator to prefer to
flesh out an estate plan with flesh-and-blood relatives; but on the other hand,
even an incomplete will discloses the beneficiaries a testator has in mind to
enrich at death. Once more, the degree of incompleteness systematically
alters the tension. If a will is substantially incomplete, we take a greater risk
by using relatively small bequests as a prototype for larger ones. 261
Given the alternatives, lawmakers could again grant courts limited dis-
cretion to deal with this form of an incomplete will. In the absence of an
effective residuary clause, courts could exercise authority either to find a
partial intestacy or to extrapolate from the fragmentary estate plan, assign-
ing portions to beneficiaries proportional to their shares under the will on
the basis of intrinsic and extrinsic evidence of the testator's intent. For ex-
ample, if partial intestacy would result in an escheat, a court could readily
infer a preference for extrapolation.2 6 Similarly, if the testator included a
23 N.Y2d 973 (App. Ct. 1969); see also, e.g., Armstrong v. Butler, 553 S.W.2d 453, 458 (Ark.
1977) ("Although there is a split of authority as to which [presumption] should prevail ....
[i]t has been held that where the two conflict, the will should be interpreted without regard to
either."); Schiedel v. Murphy's Ex'r, 188 S.W.2d 468, 469 (Ky. 1945) ("[The presumptions]
must be carefully balanced against each other. One is of no greater force than the other.");
In re Rouse's Estate, 87 A.2d 281, 283 (Pa. 1952) (describing the presumptions as "equally
potent" resulting in a "conflict of rules"). For an academic observation, see Frances H. Foster,
The Family Paradigm ofInheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. Rav. 199, 212-13 (2001).
261. Cf Kesselring v. Nowak (Estate of Verdisson), 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 363, 368 (Ct. App.
1992) (rejecting a party's contention that the presumption against intestacy should not apply
where the intestate portion of an estate is small relative to the testate portion). In a recent em-
pirical study, researchers hypothesized that benefactors who had created will substitutes, by
analogy, might wish to project the beneficiary named in them onto the intestacy statute. Mary
Louise Fellows et al., An Empirical Assessment of the Potential for Will Substitutes to Improve
State Intestacy Statutes, 85 IND. L.J. 409 passim (2010). The researchers further conjectured
that "the higher the value of a will substitute relative to the probate estate, the more likely [it is
that] decedents would prefer to have some of the probate estate allocated to a will-substitute
beneficiary." Id. at 414. This study relied on telephone interviews, asking subjects to respond
to hypothetical vignettes. Id. at 421-23. The researchers found no statistically significant dif-
ference between subjects' responses when the vignettes increased the value or number of will
substitutes created for the hypothetical beneficiary. Id. at 425-28. The researchers did, howev-
er, find statistically significant differences between subjects' responses stemming from the
status of the beneficiary: subjects allocated more to a "life partner" will-substitute beneficiary
than to one who comprised a collateral blood relative. Id. at 427. One cannot but suspect that
other factors may have overwhelmed status as a will-substitute beneficiary in this hypothetical
study. Subjects could have responded on the basis of their sense of who represents an appro-
priate (or inappropriate) heir-in other words, they might have allocated a similar amount of
intestate property to a life partner who took nothing under a will substitute as to one who
comprised a beneficiary-a possibility that the study failed to test. See id. at 423 (limiting the
vignettes to decedents who had created will substitutes totaling two alternative positive val-
ues).
262. See D.C. v. Estate of Parsons, 590 A.2d 133, 135 (D.C. 1991) (noting the drafting
attorney's assertion that the testator would have preferred extrapolation from the testamentary
distribution of personal property over a partial intestacy resulting in an escheat); In re Martin's
Will, 95 N.Y.S.2d 260, 262-63 (Sur. Ct. 1949) (again urging such an extrapolation, versus a
partial intestacy where no heirs appeared, raising the prospect of an escheat, but where the
court adjourned proceedings to afford time to locate heirs); see also In re Jayne, 463 N.Y.S.2d
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global negative will in her estate plan, then extrapolation almost surely
would better reflect the testator's intent than either enforcing the global neg-
ative will (again resulting in an escheat) or not enforcing it (and hence
benefiting disinherited heirs). 263 In want of any evidence, though, a default
rule-presumably following the traditional outcome of partial intestacy-
could take effect.264
Such a rule would, of course, depart from current law, reiterated in re-
cent cases. In one, a Florida court was asked to construe a homemade will
providing for only a single beneficiary and bequeathing to him everything
that the testator owned when the will was executed (but neglecting to antici-
pate and bequeath after-acquired property via a residuary clause). The court
refused the sole beneficiary's petition to grant him the rest of the estate by
implication. Rather, the court held that a partial intestacy ensued, and the heirs
took the after-acquired property. "A will is not subject to judicial revision
merely because it does not dispose of all of the testator's property," the court
opined, for "[s]ynecdoche is a rhetorical device, not a judicial doctrine. 265
Other courts concur in that assessment.266 Yet, the Florida case stood at one
edge of the continuum, and the possibility of extrapolation was sufficiently
attractive as to prompt a dissent. "Given [the testator's] clear intent" under the
facts in this case, the dissenting judge would have applied the presumption
against intestacy to correct the testator's omission of a residuary clause in fa-
vor of the sole beneficiary. 267 In its turn, the majority defended the traditional
544, 545 (App. Div. 1983) (finding that partial intestacy resulted in an escheat, but where the
surviving, lesser beneficiary under the will did not petition for an extrapolation).
263. See In re Martin's Will, 95 N.Y.S.2d at 261-62 (concerning a partial intestacy where
a global negative will was held ineffective); see also supra notes 118-120 and accompanying
text.
264. Whether the traditional rule or extrapolation comprises the majoritarian default is
unclear. Wills appearing in a number of published cases have expressly bequeathed the residue
among the named beneficiaries pro rata. E.g., Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Chancellor, 230
S.W.2d 629, 630 (Ky. 1950); Yancy v. Payne, 298 S.W. 940, 941 (Ky. 1927). Once a discre-
tionary rule was in place, a subsequent empirical study could help to reveal the likelihood of
the alternative preferences by virtue of the frequency with which the default rule was being
applied or, alternatively, overridden. Such a study could prompt reconsideration of the appli-
cable default rule.
265. Basile v. Aldrich, 70 So. 3d 682, 687 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), cert. granted, 2012
WL 5274776 (Fla. June 28, 2012) (No. SC11-2147).
266. E.g., Henderson v. Snow (In re Estate of Barnes), 407 P.2d 656, 659 (Cal. 1965)
("[A] will is never open to construction merely because it does not dispose of all the property."
(quoting DeParcq v. O'Brien (In re Estate of Beldon), 77 P.2d 1052, 1054 (Cal. 1938)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)); In re Martin's Will, 95 N.Y.S.2d 260, 261-63 (Sur. Ct. 1949)
(rejecting the argument that the absence of a residuary clause implied bequests of pro rata
shares of the residue to all beneficiaries named in the will); First Interstate Bank of Or. v.
Young, 853 P.2d 1324, 1327 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (ruling "we do not find that the absence of a
... residuary clause creates an ambiguity" which would be open to clarification by recourse to
extrinsic evidence), cert. denied, 862 P.2d 1305 (Or. 1993); see also Hammer v. Hammer, 633
S.E.2d 878, 882-83 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (drawing the same conclusion).
267. Basile, 70 So. 3d at 690-91 (Van Nortwick, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
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rule by highlighting the other edge of the continuum: "[I]f a will disposes of
only one small specific item out of a large and valuable estate, it would be
absurd to hold that the devisee of that one small item is entitled to the remain-
der of the estate. '268 Added the court, "The same logic applies in the present
case"
269
Well, not really. Although the facts of the Florida case and of the court's
hypothetical both implicate testamentary incompleteness, they lie at oppo-
site ends of the spectrum and support different inferences about intent. No
comparison could better illustrate the arbitrariness of a mechanical rule that
settles on one inference over the other.
Precedents for flexibility are scarce but not absent: here too, New Jer-
sey's probable intent doctrine applies,270 allowing courts in that state leeway
to deviate from the default rules of partial intestacy. A New Jersey court in-
voked the doctrine in 2011 when confronted with facts similar to those
assessed by the Florida court: under another homemade will, a testator be-
queathed all of his "jewelry, personal effects, household goods, works of art
and automobiles" to a single beneficiary, but neglected to specify the dispo-
sition of other assets.271 Extrinsic evidence showed further that the testator
was estranged from his statutory heirs. The court held that the will contained
a "gap" and awarded the residue to the sole beneficiary, instead of the heirs,
in order to carry out the testator's probable intent.272
3. Empirical Evidence
Whether the prevailing doctrine, applied mechanically, is likely to
thwart intent in a large enough segment of the cases as to justify revision is
another matter. Does the existing rule truly threaten to frustrate the wishes
of a significant number of testators? Or does this Article offer a solution in
search of a problem?
In order to gauge the scope of the problem, I have performed a further
empirical study of all published cases resulting in a finding of partial intes-
tacy since 1950. I was able to identify a total of 157 such cases, which I then
examined individually to assess the distance between the estate plan man-
dated by the will at issue and the estate plan prescribed by the intestacy
statute.273 By hypothesis, the greater the frequency with which those estate
268. Id. at 687 (majority opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting Goodwin v. Quigley
(In re Estate of Allen), 388 N.W.2d 705, 707 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
269. Id.
270. See supra note 254.
271. In re Estate of Duffy, 2011 WL 1327345, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Under the language of the will, if the named beneficiary
had predeceased the testator his "entire estate" was to pass to a veterinarian to care for the
testator's pets. Id.
272. Id. at* 1-2.
273. The raw data are available on request from the author. The author discarded from
the data set a number of additional partial intestacy cases beyond these 157 because infor-
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plans diverge, so that incomplete wills suggest partiality toward beneficiar-
ies who do not also comprise heirs, the greater the usefulness of judicial
discretion to follow one plan or the other when awarding the intestate por-
tion of the estate in order to effectuate probable intent.
Among the 23 cases where a single heir took the intestate portion of the
estate, that heir was the sole beneficiary under the will in 4 cases (17.4%),
one of the beneficiaries in 9 cases (39.1%), and not named in the will in 10
cases (43.5%). Among the 132 cases where multiple heirs took the intestate
portion of the estate, those heirs comprised the exclusive beneficiaries under
the will in 15 cases (11.4%); all of the heirs were included among a larger
number of will beneficiaries in 43 cases (32.6%); some of the heirs were
included among the will beneficiaries in 58 cases (43.9%); and none of the
heirs were named in the will in 16 cases (12.1%). In 2 additional cases, no
known heirs existed to take the intestate portion of the estate.
The clearest instance where we might doubt whether partial intestacy ef-
fectuates intent-namely, where no statutory heirs appear in the will, the
divergence between the will and intestacy then waxing to its maximum-
arose altogether in 28 out of the 157 cases (17.8%)-that is, in approximately
1 out of every 5.5 cases. Assuming these cases represent a random sample, the
margin of error is ± 6%. The number of partial intestacy cases in which at
least one statutory heir was left out of the will is substantially higher: a total
of 86 cases, nearly 55% of the total.
As before, though, we should take these data with a grain of salt. It
stands to reason that a disparity between the will and the intestacy statute
heightens the risk of litigation, so instances of that nature could well prove
overrepresented in the data set. That said, we can hardly dismiss the cases
found to display sharp disparities as outliers. The limited discretion pro-
posed in this Part responds to a tension encountered with some regularity in
the case law, not to an academic bagatelle.
C. The Structure of Intestacy Law
At the end of the day, we find that a case can be made for injecting lim-
ited discretion into all three of the doctrines associated with incomplete
wills-the effectiveness and consequences of redefinitive provisions, ad-
vancements, and partially invalid or wholly absent residuary clauses. At the
same time, it must be admitted, introducing such discretion into the law
goes against the doctrinal grain: by tradition, intestacy law has operated me-
chanically. Whether persuasive reasons exist to break with this tradition
remains a question we cannot escape. Do total and partial intestacy raise
problems sufficiently distinct as to call for asymmetric treatment under our
law? Or is one merely a theoretical subdivision of the other-as they are
typically treated today?
mation provided in the opinions was too sparse to permit the cases to be coded with reasona-
ble certainty. In several instances, case coding nevertheless required the author to draw
inferences from the opinions. For coding purposes, the author treated nominal bequests as the
functional equivalent of disinheritance.
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To explore this issue, we need to isolate the rationales for an inflexible
scheme of total intestacy in order to identify the limits of their application.
As it happens, the merits of the current framework have aroused debate, and
some commentators advocate loosening the rules of intestacy across the
board for the same reason emphasized in this Article: to wit, not all people
are alike, intent varies case by case, and no rules of intestacy can capture all
of the variables that might lead persons to prefer one scheme of distribution
over another.
27 4
Defenders of the status quo make several points in rebuttal. Some warn
that flexible rules of intestacy would create "a bureaucratic nightmare" of
endless litigation,275 occasioning court costs that the state historically under-
takes to subsidize. What is more, "[w]hen a decedent does not leave a valid
will, it is impossible to accurately determine just what the decedent intended
as to the distribution of his property."276 In other words, on top of court
costs, the inquiry would entail error costs, possibly approaching those of an
inflexible rule. Finally, as I myself argued in a prior work, the primary eco-
nomic virtue of a mechanical scheme of intestacy is the benefactor's ability
to rely on that scheme to generate her estate plan. A planned intestacy can
minimize transaction costs, but the opportunity for planning largely disap-
pears when a benefactor cannot predict with assurance what distribution
would follow if she fails to execute a will.277
None of these concerns assert themselves strongly in connection with
partial intestacy. Whereas roughly (or slightly under) half of all Americans
die totally intestate, 27 partial intestacy occurs less frequently, mitigating the
burden that discretionary rules, when confined to those cases, would impose
on courts. And by further restricting the inquiry to binary choices-between
enforcing negative wills vel non, applying the doctrine of advancement vel
non, extrapolating from the estate plan set down in the will vel non-as ad-
vocated in this Article, lawmakers would narrow the opportunity for
litigation in those cases. A few states already carve out limited exceptions
from the automatic operation of intestate succession in situations where in-
tent is bound to vary widely.279 To do so here would fit partial intestacy into
the same, defined pattern.
274. For a recent discussion and proposal, see Susan N. Gary, The Probate Definition of
Family: A Proposal for Guided Discretion in Intestacy, 45 U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 787 passim
(2012). For earlier commentary, see the references cited in Hirsch, supra note 8, at 1065
n.138.
275. Bruce H. Mann, Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code, 142 U.
PA. L. REV. 1033, 1050 (1994); see also, ATKINSON, supra note 142, at 33.
276. Schneider, supra note 22, at 426; see also, Mann, supra note 275, at 1050.
277. Hirsch, supra note 8, at 1065-69.
278. For empirical studies, see id. at 1051 n.73.
279. See, e.g., 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2108 (making an adopted child an intestate
heir of her natural parent if evidence shows that the two "maintained a family relationship'
and otherwise not); see also supra notes 173-174 and accompanying text (noting another such
discretionary, binary choice within the Uniform Probate Code). In Great Britain, in cases of
escheat, the Crown can claim intestate property but has broad statutory discretion to distribute
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Nor does the prospect of judicial error loom as large with respect to flex-
ible rules of partial intestacy. The inquiry becomes less speculative because,
unlike cases of complete intestacy, here courts do have an executed will to
provide evidence of intent. The investigation would not be open ended, and
a court would not have license to put into effect substantive terms that a tes-
tator expressed informally; rather, a court would choose between expanding
from a formalized, finalized document and following the intestacy statute.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the economic argument that flexi-
ble rules of intestacy obstruct planning fails to apply here, for the simple
reason that no one plans for a partial intestacy.280 As noted earlier, once a
testator bears the transaction cost of executing an estate plan, the marginal
cost of completing the will becomes negligible. 281 Hence, a flexible rule for
completing an incomplete will would remain transaction-cost efficient.
Ultimately, then, we may judge the problems of complete and partial in-
testacy as discontinuous, despite their superficial similarities.
CONCLUSION
Supported in part by empirical evidence, this Article has made the case
for roping off the problem of partial intestacy from that of complete intesta-
cy and treating the two differently under the law. Even as we continue to
formulate and apply the rules of total intestacy rigidly, I have argued that the
rules of partial intestacy would benefit from greater plasticity. Room for
discretion is warranted because the reliability of the provisions of an incom-
plete will as a template for the missing parts varies with the facts and with
the scope of the deficiency. Inflexible rules of partial intestacy operate too
arbitrarily to effectuate intent.
I have presented the argument for this approach intrinsically (so to say)
within inheritance law. But there may exist a second, larger justification for
taking such a tack. For the problem of textual incompleteness also arises in
other areas of law-including the law of contracts, often a compelling point
of comparison for the law of gratuitous transfers.28 2
Under the common law, an obligationally incomplete contract-lacking
a term as to price, for instance-was historically held "indefinite" and hence
void.283 In this manner, courts used to adopt a mechanical approach to the
problem of contractual incompleteness. No longer: courts nowadays claim
greater latitude to treat an incomplete contract either as preliminary to an
that property among the decedent's dependents or loved ones. KERRIDGE, supra note 236, § 2-
40.
280. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
281. See supra text following note 8.
282. In earlier work, I posited the categorical association of wills and contracts, and I
have explored in detail the analogies between inheritance and contractual default rules, see
Hirsch, supra note 8, and between substantive limits on the right to contract and to bequeath,
see Adam J. Hirsch, Freedom of Testation / Freedom of Contract, 95 MINN. L. REv. 2180
passim (2011).
283. E.g., Varney v. Ditmars, 111 N.E. 822, 823 (N.Y 1916).
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agreement or as an enforceable agreement with open terms, to be filled in as
courts deem reasonable.284 This modem rule recognizes the variability of
intent concerning the implications of contractual incompleteness, which can
reflect either a want of agreement or an agreement to agree.
Although deliberate incompleteness is rare in connection with an in-
complete will, by analogy, uncertainties of intent remain, as outlined in the
last many pages. To respond by making inheritance doctrine more flexible
would structurally amalgamate the law of incomplete wills with that of in-
complete contracts, a domain in which bracketed judicial discretion seems
to function well enough in practice. Both would then find consistent treat-
ment within the meta-category of the law of transfers-not an imperative, to
be sure, but a symmetry that would follow naturally from the close connec-
tion between the two fields.
We need not, at any rate, raise the issue quite to these heights of abstrac-
tion. However theoretically insightful, this Article strives at bottom to be
practically inciteful. It is enough to rouse lawmakers to reassess an array of
-doctrines that-like too many others in the inheritance realm-have long
met with analytical neglect.
284. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 33(3), 204 (1981).
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